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SEVERE BRAIN INJURY, DISABILITY, AND THE LAW:
ACHIEVING JUSTICE FOR A
MARGINALIZED POPULATION
MEGAN S. WRIGHT, NINA VARSAVA, JOEL RAMIREZ, KYLE EDWARDS,
NATHAN GUEVREMONT, TAMAR EZER, AND JOSEPH J. FINs*
ABSTRACT
Thousands of persons with severe brain injury who are minimally conscious or "locked
in" are wrongly treated as if they are unconscious. Such individuals are unable to advocate
for themselves and are typically segregated from society in hospitals or nursing homes. As a
result, they constitute a class of persons who often lack access to adequate medical care,
rehabilitation, and assistive devices that could aid them in communication and recovery.
While this problem is often approached from a medical or scientific point of view, here we
frame it as a legal issue amenable to legal remedies. This Article comprehensively explores
and analyzes sources of ederal, state, and international human rights law that can be lev-
eraged-both in traditional and novel ways-to improve the lives and protect the rights of
persons with severe brain injury. We argue that state laws may be the most promising basis
for legal action to ameliorate the clinical marginalization and societal neglect faced by per-
sons with severe brain injury, and to promote their recovery and reintegration into their
communities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The care of persons with severe brain injury presents significant
clinical, legal, and normative challenges. Such individuals are often
unable to advocate for themselves and are typically segregated from
society in hospitals or nursing homes. As a result, they constitute a
class of persons who often lack access to adequate medical care, re-
habilitation, and assistive devices that could aid them in communi-
cation and recovery. While this problem is often approached from a
medical or scientific point of view, here we frame it as an ethical,
and in particular a legal issue, which is amenable to legal remedies.
Consider the following examples that are emblematic, but not
exhaustive, of the types of clinical and social problems faced by per-
sons with severe brain injury, each of which are illustrative of cir-
cumstances where the law might be leveraged to improve the lives
of people with severe brain injury. The first two vignettes are drawn
from over fifty narratives about patient and family experiences with
severe brain injury,' while the third is drawn from news coverage
1. These narratives are drawn from extensive interviews, conducted as part of re-
search for the recently published manuscript JOSEPH J. FINS, RIGHTS COME TO MIND:
BRAIN INJURY, ETHICS, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSCIOUSNESS (2015) [hereinafter FINS,
BRAIN INJURY]. We have permission to use patients' names in the first two narratives, and
the third example is drawn from the public record.
SEVERE BRAIN INJURY
about the experiences of a person with brain injury under
guardianship.2
Margaret (Maggie) Worthen was a senior in college in 2006 when
she had a brain stem stroke that left her unconscious. She was ulti-
mately diagnosed as permanently vegetative and discharged to a
nursing home, where she received little rehabilitation. Maggie's
mother, having witnessed glimmers of behaviors that suggested
Maggie had some degree of awareness, was concerned that the vege-
tative diagnostic label was mistaken and that Maggie was missing
out on possibilities for improvement. Consequently, she moved Mag-
gie to a facility for young people with traumatic brain injury. Ulti-
mately, one of Maggie's neurologists referred her to the Consortium
for the Advanced Study of Brain Injury (CASBI) at Weill Cornell
Medical College and Rockefeller University for additional study.3
Maggie was found to be in the minimally conscious state,4 based on
bedside evaluation using neuropsychological evaluation and func-
tional neuroimaging.5 This diagnostic distinction is significant be-
cause it indicates that rather than being permanently unconscious,
Maggie was intermittently conscious and had the prospect for further
improvement.6 Without her mother's advocacy, Maggie might never
have received the proper diagnosis, and accordingly might have lost
the chance for a better outcome.
Next, consider the case of John Harmon, Jr. who, at the age of
thirty-three, sustained a severe brain injury as a result of a car acci-
dent.' His doctors predicted that he would be permanently vegeta-
tive. Nevertheless, John's condition evolved into the minimally con-
scious state. His father reported that John was severely neglected by
hospital staff, evidenced, for example, by a severe bed sore which
2. See, e.g., Pam Fessler, Disabled and Fighting for the Right to Vote, NPR (Sept. 4,
2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/09/04/492430780/disabled-and-fighting-for-the-right-
to-vote.
3. One of us, Joseph Fins, is co-director of CASBI.
4. See generally FINS, BRAIN INJURY, supra note 1 (discussing Maggie's case in more
detail); Joseph J. Fins & Nicholas D. Schiff, In Search of Hidden Minds, 27 SC. AM. MIND
44, 44-45 (2016) (discussing disorders of consciousness and Maggie's case); J.T. Giacino et
al., The Minimally Conscious State: Definition and Diagnostic Criteria, 58 NEUROLO-
GY 349, 349-53 (2002) [hereinafter Giacino et al., Minimally Conscious State] (describing
the minimally conscious state).
5. FINS, BRAIN INJURY, supra note 1, at 252-56; Fins & Schiff, supra note 4, at 49-50.
6. Michele H. Lammi et al., The Minimally Conscious State and Recovery Potential:
A Follow-Up Study 2 to 5 Years After Traumatic Brain Injury, 86 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED.
& REHAB. 746, 746 (2005).
7. FINS, BRAIN INJURY, supra note 1, at 189-91 (Institutional Review Board-approved
interview at Weill Cornell Medical College by Jennifer Hersh, Transcript IN351H on Au-
gust 28, 2008).
8. Giacino et al., Minimally Conscious State, supra note 4.
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would not have developed had John been given proper care.' While he
did not demonstrate the normal signs of someone with consciousness
and was apparently treated as though he was completely uncon-
scious, John, in fact, possessed some degree of awareness. Neverthe-
less, he was segregated from the medical mainstream and deprived of
the opportunity to be maximally integrated into the nexus of home,
family, and community, which could be understood to constitute a
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), as affirmed in
Olmstead.o As John's case suggests, the care received by individuals
with severe brain injury in chronic care can be suboptimal and place
their medical condition and potential for rehabilitation at risk.
Finally, consider the case of David Rector. In 2009, David suffered
a stroke, which resulted in a "locked in" state-meaning he was con-
scious, but with limited motor output." He was appointed a conser-
vator, a necessary protection given the severity of his disability. The
conservatorship disqualified him from voting, a routine violation of a
fundamental right. In 2016, California changed its probate code sec-
tion about conservatees and voting, however, and conservatees now
retain voting rights unless they are unable to communicate "with or
without reasonable accommodations, a desire to participate in the
voting process."2 With this legal change, David petitioned for rein-
statement of his voting rights, and, with the assistance of electronic
voice, was able to say to the court, "I, David Rector, want my voting
rights restored, immediately." 3 After several hearings, the probate
judge finally reinstated David's voting rights.14 Several other states'
guardianship laws are not as progressive as California's, 5 and a
large proportion of the population of persons with severe brain injury
may thus continue to be denied the fundamental right to vote.
As these examples demonstrate, the obstacles individuals and
their families must confront after a severe brain injury are not solely
medical in nature. Indeed, after surviving a severe brain injury, peo-
ple navigate a changed world in which the law may play a large part
9. FINS, BRAIN INJURY, supra note 1, at 189.
10. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
11. SPECTRUM INST., Spectrum Institute to File a Class-Action Complaint with the
DOJ to Restore the Voting Rights of Thousands with Disabilities in California, Bus. WIRE
(Aug. 22, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160822005209/en/
Spectrum-Institute-File-Class-Action-Complaint-DOJ-toC2 %AORESTORE [https://perma.cc/
V2N5-3VE3].
12. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1910 (West 2016).
13. Fessler, supra note 2.
14. Caroline Modarressy-Tehrani, The Right to Be Counted: One Disabled Man's Fight to





either in denying or ensuring them necessary resources and full in-
clusion in society.
Because the most egregious violations of ethics and norms tend to
occur in patients with the most severe injuries, much of our focus will
be on patients with severe disorders of consciousness. Their struggles
take place in the shadows, as the average person may be unaware of
the degree to which these individuals are disregarded and their
rights violated. The law is not solely an impediment, however, but
can also supply the means to aid in the recovery and restoration of
citizenship and dignity for persons with severe brain injury. This Ar-
ticle comprehensively explores and analyzes sources of law that can
improve the situation of persons with severe brain injury.
In Part II, we describe the epidemiology and diagnostic framework
of severe brain injury and, given that many severe brain injuries re-
sult in disorders of consciousness, we briefly define these disorders
and their clinical implications. In Part III, we identify relevant fed-
eral law that applies to persons with severe brain injury and analyze
how these laws can be leveraged to advance the status of such per-
sons in civil society. In this Part, we focus on the U.S. Constitution,
the ADA, and the Affordable Care Act (ACA), as examples of law that
apply to all persons with severe brain injury. We further analyze fed-
eral laws that will be applicable only to certain subpopulations, such
as children, veterans, Medicare recipients, and those who need access
to assistive devices, which are regulated by the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA). In Part IV, we identify relevant state law that
applies to this population and, using the case of California, illustrate
how existing laws can be used or modified to rectify the injustice per-
sons with severe brain injury endure. Such laws include state disabil-
ity laws, guardianship laws, and tort law. In Part V, we expand our
inquiry beyond the United States, examining the relevance of inter-
national law and human rights for persons with severe brain injury.
We conclude with our assessment of the most promising legal strate-
gies to address the unlawful and unjust treatment of persons with
severe brain injury, and call upon legal and medical practitioners to
advocate on behalf of this vulnerable and marginalized population.
II. EPIDEMIOLOGY OF SEVERE BRAIN INJURY AND DIAGNOSTIC
FRAMEWORK OF DISORDERS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Patients like Maggie, John, and David can be said to suffer from
disorders of consciousness.'6 Disorders of consciousness comprise a
16. Joseph T. Giacino et al., Disorders of Consciousness After Acquired Brain Injury:
The State of the Science, 10 NATURE REVS. NEUROLOGY 99, 99 (2014) [hereinafter Giacino
et al., Disorders of Consciousness].
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range of conditions, including brain death, the vegetative state (VS),
the minimally conscious state (MCS), and emergence from the MCS."
These are amongst the most severe brain injuries, which nationally
account for approximately 2.5 million emergency room (ER) visits.
Of these ER visits, 87% (2,213,826) result in discharge (e.g., patients
with concussion and milder injuries)," 2% (52,844) result in death,
and 11% (283,630) require hospital admission.2 0 It is from this latter
category that the incidence of patients with disorders of conscious-
ness are drawn. Overall U.S. prevalence of patients having a disabil-
ity from traumatic brain injury (TBI) is estimated to be between 3.2
and 5.3 million persons.2 ' The epidemiology of other conditions that
can cause brain morbidity and mortality, such as stroke and infec-
tious encephalopathies, would add to this prevalence. For example,
795,000 Americans have a stroke each year, killing 140,000 individu-
als, resulting in a survivor prevalence of 8 2 % with varying degrees of
disability.22
Most injuries able to cause a disorder of consciousness begin with
a coma.2 3 Clinically, a coma is an eyes-closed state of unconscious-
ness. Patients are totally unresponsive to external stimuli and ap-
pear asleep.2 4 They do not have sleep-cycles and patients are unre-
sponsive to their environment.2 5 Comas are self-limited and typically
last two weeks, unless they are prolonged by medication or by an on-
going illness.2 6 Patients can recover completely from a coma (as fol-
lowing anesthesia or intoxication), progress to brain death,2 7 or, fail-
ing those outcomes, move into the VS.28
17. Id.
18. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVEN-
TION, REPORT TO CONGRESS: TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY IN THE UNITED STATES: EPIDEMIOL-
OGY AND REHABILITATION (2015) [hereinafter CDC REPORT TO CONGRESS].
19. Even "milder" injuries can have long-term health consequences. See, e.g., Daniel
H. Daneshvar et al., Long-Term Consequences: Effects on Normal Development Profile After
Concussion, 22 PHYSICAL MED. REHAB. CLINICS N. Am. 683 (2011).
20. CDC REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 18, at 2.
21. Id.
22. Stroke Facts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
stroke/facts.htm [https://perma.cc/GLM4-LA7V] (last updated Sept. 6, 2017).
23. See generally Giacino et al., Disorders of Consciousness, upra note 16 (describing




27. Ad Hoc Comm. of the Harvard Med. Sch., A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.
AM. MED. ASS'N 85, 87 (1968).




The VS is the isolated recovery of the autonomic functions of the
brain stem without higher cortical function.2 9 First described in a
landmark Lancet paper in 1972, 30 and brought to prominence in
landmark right-to-die cases such as In re Quinlan,31 Cruzan v. Direc-
tor, Missouri Department of Health,3 2 and In re Schiavo,3 3 patients in
the VS demonstrate "wakeful unresponsiveness" in which their eyes
are open but there is no awareness of self, others, or the environ-
ment. 34 Vegetative patients have sleep/wake cycles, blinking, eye
movements, and even the startle reflex. 35 Importantly, they breathe
spontaneously without ventilator support.36 The VS is considered per-
sistent when it has lasted thirty days and is permanent three months
after anoxic brain injury or twelve months following TBI. 37 Before the
VS becomes permanent, there is a window during which patients
may surreptitiously move into the MCS. 38
The MCS formally entered the medical literature in 2002 through
a consensus tatement published in Neurology under the rubric of the
Aspen Criteria.39 Importantly, in contrast to vegetative patients, min-
imally conscious patients are conscious, although this is often not
recognized by clinical staff.40 Patients in the MCS have "minimal but
definite awareness of self or environmental awareness."4 1 Minimally
conscious patients may demonstrate intention, attention, and
memory.42 They may track a family member when they enter the
room, say their name, or grasp for an object (like a cup).43
Clinical assessment of the MCS is challenging and prone to error.
Dr. Schnakers and her colleagues demonstrated that 4 1% of patients
tested with severe TBI in long-term care thought to be vegetative
29. Giacino et al., Disorders of Consciousness, upra note 16, at 100.
30. Bryan Jennett & Fred Plum, Persistent Vegetative State After Brain Damage: A
Syndrome in Search of a Name, LANCET, Apr. 1972, at 734, 734.
31. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
32. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
33. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
34. Jennett & Plum, supra note 30.
35. Id. at 734.
36. Id. at 735.
37. A.A. Howsepian, The 1994 Multi-Society Task Force Consensus Statement on the
Persistent Vegetative State: A Critical Analysis, 12 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 15 n.38 (1996).
38. Joseph J. Fins, Neuroethics, Neuroimaging, and Disorders of Consciousness: Prom-
ise or Peril?, 122 TRANSACTIONS AM. CLINICAL & CLIMATOLOGICAL ASS'N 336, 339-40 (2010).
39. Giacino et al., Minimally Conscious State, supra note 4, at 350.
40. See generally FINS, BRAIN INJURY, supra note 1.
41. Giacino et al., Disorders of Consciousness, upra note 16, at 100.
42. Id. at 99.
43. Id. at 100.
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were in fact minimally conscious on closer examination.4 4 Others
have found similar diagnostic error rates between 2 0-4 0%. 45 In the
MCS, behaviors are not reliably reproduced and are episodically
demonstrated. When a patient is asked to repeat a behavior seen by
family members, they will typically not comply with the request,
leading practitioners to believe that a family's observations are
prompted by wishful thinking or outright denial, when in fact this
failure of reproducibility derives from the underlying biology of the
MCS. Such clinical confounders-coupled with the nihilism associat-
ed with severe brain injury and, in particular, the VS4 6-help explain
the diagnostic challenge of distinguishing the VS from the MCS.47
When behaviors are reproduced reliably, patients are said to have
emerged from the minimally conscious state (MCS-E). 4 8
Although technically not a disorder of consciousness, the Locked-
in State (LIS) is often considered in kind because it needs to be dis-
tinguished from the VS. Persons in the LIS appear vegetative be-
cause they have a paucity of motor output while retaining "normal"
consciousness. This condition vividly came to public attention
through Jean-Dominique Bauby's memoir, The Diving Bell and the
Butterfly, which he wrote by blinking in code.49
There has been no comprehensive epidemiology of the incidence
and prevalence of disorders of consciousness, which we view as indic-
ative of this population's marginalizationo5 the complexity of study-
ing dynamic brain states5 ' the use of metrics which measure behav-
iors but fail to assess consciousness, and the novelty of the MCS as a
44. Caroline Schnakers et al., Diagnostic Accuracy of the Vegetative and Minimally
Conscious State: Clinical Consensus Versus Standardized Neurobehavioral Assessment, 9
BMC NEUROLOGY 35, 37-38 (2009).
45. Keith Andrews et al., Misdiagnosis of the Vegetative State: Retrospective Study in
a Rehabilitation Unit, 313 BRIT. MED. J. 13, 13-14 (1996); Nancy L. Childs et al., Accuracy
of Diagnosis of Persistent Vegetative State, 43 NEUROLOGY 1465, 1465 (1993); F.C. Wilson
et al., Vegetative State and Minimally Responsive Patients-Regional Survey, Long-Term
Case Outcomes and Service Recommendations, 17 NEUROREHAB. 231, 231 (2002).
46. Joseph J. Fins, Constructing an Ethical Stereotaxy for Severe Brain Injury: Bal-
ancing Risks, Benefits and Access, 4 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 323, 323 (2003); FINS,
BRAIN INJURY, supra note 1.
47. Giacino et al., Disorders of Consciousness, upra note 16, at 103.
48. Id. at 101.
49. JEAN-DOMINIQUE BAUBY, THE DIVING BELL AND THE BUTTERFLY: A MEMOIR OF
LIFE IN DEATH (1997).
50. See Joseph J. Fins et al., Late Recovery from the Minimally Conscious State: Ethi-
cal and Policy Implications, 68 NEUROLOGY 304, 306 (2007) (calling for comprehensive
epidemiology).
51. Joseph J. Fins et al., The Minimally Conscious State: A Diagnosis in Search of an
Epidemiology, 64 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 1400 (2007) (discussing the complexity of the
methodology of studying changing brain states).
320 [Vol. 45:313
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diagnostic category.52 With these methodological caveats in mind, the
prevalence of the VS in the United States has been estimated to be
between 40 and 168 patients per million of the population.53 A more
recent European meta-analysis suggests a range of 0.2 to 6.1 vegeta-
tive patients per 100,000 of the population.54 Estimates of the MCS
are complicated by similar methodological concerns and pervasive
diagnostic error rates, as well as the unfamiliarity of clinicians with
this diagnostic category. Dr. Strauss and his colleagues estimate a
prevalence of between 112,000 and 280,000 adult and pediatric pa-
tients in the MCS,55 but data is limited to dated extrapolations of
single state databases.56
These errors are clinically, ethically, and normatively significant.51
Misdiagnosing a minimally conscious patient as vegetative is clinically
significant because pain control and palliation are presumed to be un-
necessary because the patient is falsely thought insensate. A diagnos-
tic error is also problematic with respect to prognosis as individuals
52. J. Graham Beaumont & Pamela M. Kenealy, Incidence and Prevalence of the
Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States, 15 NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL REHAB. 184, 184
(2005) (discussing methodological challenges); W.S. van Erp et al., The Vegetative
State/ Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome: A Systematic Review of Prevalence Studies,
21 EUR. J. NEUROLOGY 1361, 1362-65 (2014) (noting that some studies did not include
the MCS).
Determining prevalence rates is confounded by the natural history of these conditions
and the behavioral metrics used to assess these conditions. Because of the dynamic nature
of these brain states and care decisions, prevalence is not fixed. Patients may evolve from
the VS into the MCS, before the VS becomes permanent. Moreover, decisions to withhold or
withdraw care can preclude this progression. In addition, because these conditions relate to
disorders of consciousness, and not behaviors, metrics like the Glasgow Coma and Outcome
Scales, which take behaviors as a proxy for consciousness, can under-represent patients
who have a discordance between thought and action. This phenomenon has been demon-
strated over the past decade through functional neuroimaging which has demonstrated
that patients thought vegetative by behavioral criteria show responsiveness on brain flares,
indicating that they are responding to their environment. See Joseph J. Fins & Nicholas D.
Schiff, Shades of Gray: New Insights into the Vegetative State, 36 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 8, 8
(2006); Martin M. Monti et al., Willful Modulation of Brain Activity in Disorders of Con-
sciousness, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 579, 579 (2010).
53. Beaumont & Kenealy, supra note 52.
54. W.S. van Erp et al., supra note 52, at 1365.
55. David J. Strauss et al., Life Expectancy of Children in Vegetative and Minimally
Conscious States, 23 PEDIATRIC NEUROLOGY 312, 316 (2000).
56. NAT'L INST. ON DISABILITY, INDEP. LIVING, & REHAB. RES., REHABILITATION AC-
CESS AND OUTCOME AFTER SEVERE TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY, at II, X (2016), http://media-
ns.mghcpd.org.s3.amazonaws.com/spauldingtbilrehabilitation-access-and-outcome-after-
severe-tbi-briefing-book.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VBF-BACG]; see also Anbesaw W. Selassie
et al., Incidence of Long-Term Disability Following Traumatic Brain Injury Hospitaliza-
tion, United States, 2003, 23 J. HEAD TRAUMA REHAB. 123, 125, 129 (2008); Eduard
Zaloshnja et al., Prevalence of Long-Term Disability from Traumatic Brain Injury in the
Civilian Population of the United States, 23 J. HEAD TRAUMA REHAB. 394, 399 (2008).
57. See generally FINS, BRAIN INJURY, supra note 1; Joseph J. Fins, Bring Them Back,
AEON (May 10, 2016), https://aeon.co/essays/thousands-of-patients-diagnosed-as-vegetative-
are-actually-aware [https://perma.cc/BD6V-7YB9].
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who are in the MCS may be amenable to rehabilitation and to pro-
gressive improvement, while patients who are permanently vegeta-
tive will not have subsequent recovery.58 Trapped and mischaracter-
ized in what is euphemistically described as "custodial care," these pa-
tients can be deemed eligible for neurorehabilitation and the skilled
physical therapy that can lead to the recovery of functional independ-
ence in up to 21% of the most grievously injured patients.59
III. JUSTICE FOR PERSONS WITH SEVERE BRAIN INJURY
UNDER FEDERAL LAW
We begin by addressing sources of federal law that can be lever-
aged to assist persons with severe brain injury in recovering their
maximum potential post-injury and then being reintegrated in their
communities. We first address possible constitutional claims. We
then move on to the more promising remedies available under the
ADA. We next briefly address the implications of the ACA for persons
with severe brain injury. We conclude this Part by describing sources
of law that apply to particular subpopulations of persons with severe
brain injury; namely, veterans, children, Medicare beneficiaries, and
those who could benefit from access to drugs and devices.
A. United States Constitution
Constitutional claims on behalf of persons with severe brain injury
could be litigated under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause or Equal Protection Clause. The benefit of constitutional rights
compared to statutory rights, such as those granted under the ADA, is
that such rights are guaranteed, rather than subject to politics or eco-
nomic constraints.0 However, any such claims require state action to
trigger constitutional review, meaning action by private actors is not
subject to Fourteenth Amendment constraints."' Additionally, due pro-
cess claims must be framed in terms of unconstitutional deprivations
of life, liberty, or property given that the Constitution is one of nega-
tive rights rather than positive rights, so substantive due process
58. Giacino et al., Disorders of Consciousness, upra note 16, at 12-13.
59. Risa Nakase-Richardson et al., Longitudinal Outcome of Patients with Disordered
Consciousness in the NIDRR TBI Model Systems Programs, 29 J. NEUROTRAUMA 59, 62-64
(2012).
60. Barry Friedman & Sara Solow, The Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 81
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 92, 154-55 (2013); James E. Ryan, A Constitutional Right to Preschool?,
94 CALIF. L. REV. 49, 96 (2006) (discussing this in the context of rights to education).
61. LAURA ROTHSTEIN & ANN C. MCGINLEY, DISABILITY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS 25 (5th ed. 2010).
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claims asserting, for example, a right to healthcare, rehabilitation,62
community-based resources,6 3 or employment will not be successful.
Furthermore, persons with disabilities are not a class that receives
heightened scrutiny when courts are reviewing claims of equal protec-
tion violations. All of these factors present significant challenges for
constitutional claims.
1. Due Process
Past federal cases have struck down unlawful treatment of per-
sons with disabilities "by public institutions [and have] accorded dis-
abled people many of the same constitutional rights to due process
and equal protection as able-bodied people have."6 4 In the early
1970s, for example, lower federal courts ruled for children with disa-
bilities with respect to state laws that refused to provide public edu-
cation for these children." Courts held that such laws violated both
due process and equal protection.6 6 Furthermore, federal courts have
also held that states cannot indiscriminately institutionalize persons
with mental disabilities because this violates procedural due pro-
cess.6 7 These cases focused on discriminatory state action that de-
prived persons of fundamental iberties.
Persons with disabilities and their advocates may prefer constitu-
tional guarantees of a right to social goods, such as healthcare. But, as
noted above, the Federal Constitution implicates negative rather than
positive rights.6 8 Some scholars have noted, however, that there is a
62. See Megan S. Wright & Joseph J. Fins, Rehabilitation, Education, and the Inte-
gration of Individuals with Severe Brain Injury into Civil Society: Towards an Expanded
Rights Agenda in Response to New Insights from Translational Neuroethics and Neurosci-
ence, 16 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 233 (2016) (presenting novel legal argument
asserting a right to rehabilitation).
63. Such services may be required under the ADA, however. See discussion infra Sec-
tion III.B.2.
64. RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL
DISABILITY POLICY 37 (2d ed. 1984).
65. See, e.g., Pa. Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 302
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (holding that state laws that excluded mentally retarded children from
public schools violated guarantees of procedural due process and equal protection); Mills v.
Bd. of Educ. of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that exclusion of children
with disabilities from public education violates due process).
66. ROTHSTEIN & MCGINLEY, supra note 61, at 6-7.
67. See Wyatt v. Hardin, No. 3195-N, 1975 WL 33692, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 28, 1975)
(asserting that the state cannot indiscriminately institutionalize persons with mental disa-
bilities); see also David Ferleger, The Constitutional Right to Community Services, 26 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 763, 763-64 (2010) (discussing constitutional arguments under both due
process and equal protection clauses for involuntary confinement/institutionalization of
persons with intellectual disabilities).
68. Scholars debate the extent to which this distinction makes sense and argue that
the Constitution does afford positive rights. See, e.g., Edward Rubin, The Affordable Care
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substantive due process-based negative right to health:9 "[I]ndividuals
have a constitutional right to protect their health. This right, moreo-
ver, may include a right both to refuse care and to access care-not at
government expense, but without government interference.""0
This right is implicated when the government decides "to crimi-
nalize or otherwise take certain forms of safe and effective healthcare
off the table."7 Even when it seems like the government is making
such decisions through choices, such as whether state Medicaid funds
can be used to pay for certain medical procedures, there is often no
state action given that the decision is about subsidizing certain forms
of healthcare rather than directly restricting access.7 2 So, should a
person with severe brain injury be denied access to adequate medical
care, rehabilitation, drugs, or devices on the basis of an adverse med-
ical necessity determination, the state action requirement presents a
barrier to constitutional claims asserting the negative right to
healthcare.7 3
Another strategy is to bring a liberty-based "dignity" claim on
behalf of persons with severe brain injury.74 Leading constitutional
scholars have reported that in practice, substantive due process and
equal protection claims are often combined in jurisprudence and are
"hybrid rights."7 5 However, asserting these hybrid rights would have
to take the form of arguing that the government was infringing a fun-
damental liberty, and again, aside from unlawful institutionalization,
it is difficult to see how this would occur in the case of persons with
severe brain injury given that much of what they need involves "access
to" certain resources rather than freedom from some imposition.76
Act, the Constitutional Meaning of Statutes, and the Emerging Doctrine of Positive Consti-
tutional Rights, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1639, 1643, 1688, 1689, 1691 (2012).
69. B. Jessie Hill, What is the Meaning of Health? Constitutional Implications of De-
fining "Medical Necessity" and "Essential Health Benefits" Under the Affordable Care Act,
38 AM. J.L. & MED. 445, 447-48 (2012).
70. Id. at 461-62 (describing how the right can be traced to Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11 (1905), and abortion regulation exceptions for preserving the life or health of
the mother).
71. Id. at 460.
72. Id. at 465. This could change at some point in the future, however, if the govern-
ment is the sole provider or regulator of healthcare. Id. at 467-68.
73. This does not mean that other sources of law cannot be used to assert such rights.
See discussion infra Sections III.B.1, III.B.2, III.C.
74. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 749 (2011).
75. Id. at 748-50.
76. The problem with dignity-based claims is that they have really only been success-
ful with respect to negative rights rather than positive rights. Areto A. Imoukhuede, Edu-
cation Rights and the New Due Process, 47 IND. L. REV. 467, 506 (2014); see, e.g., Tennessee
v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531-33 (2004) (holding that the government unlawfully deprived




In order for persons with disabilities to prevail in court when al-
leging an equal protection violation under the Constitution, there
must be a federal, state, or local law that treats them differently from
other groups, and the claimant must be able to demonstrate that the
law is based on irrational prejudice or animus." Disability is not con-
sidered a suspect classification, and thus equal protection violation
claims brought by persons with disabilities do not receive higher lev-
els of scrutiny."
The most instructive case applying equal protection analysis to
persons with disabilities is City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cen-
ter." The issue in this case was that the City of Cleburne's zoning
ordinance required a special use permit for a group home for persons
with intellectual disabilities.0 When the group home applied for such
a permit, it was denied. The group home then initiated a lawsuit, al-
leging that the city's decision was based on discrimination against
persons with intellectual disabilities and thus constituted an equal
protection violation. An appellate court held for the group home, as-
serting that intellectual disability was a "quasi-suspect classification
and that it should assess the validity of the ordinance under inter-
mediate-level scrutiny."8' When analyzing the specific issue in this
case, the Supreme Court summarized the appellate court's reasoning
as follows:
[I]n light of the history of "unfair and often grotesque mistreat-
ment" of the retarded, discrimination against them was "likely to
reflect deep-seated prejudice." In addition, the mentally retarded
lacked political power, and their condition was immutable. The
court considered heightened scrutiny to be particularly appropri-
ate in this case, because the city's ordinance withheld a benefit
which, although not fundamental, was very important to the men-
upper floors of a courthouse); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that a
state's anti-sodomy laws deprived persons of the right to engage in private sexual behavior).
77. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985) ("The
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall 'de-
ny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' which is essential-
ly a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike. . . . The general
rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification
drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . When social or
economic legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide lati-
tude . . . ." (citations omitted)).
78. Id. at 440.
79. Id. at 432.
80. Id. at 447.
81. Id. at 437-38.
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tally retarded. Without group homes, the court stated, the retard-
ed could never hope to integrate themselves into the community.2
The Supreme Court held that persons with intellectual disabilities
are not a quasi-suspect class, however, based on several reasons.
First, persons with such disabilities are different from others, and
thus legislators are lawfully able to treat them differently.8 3 Second,
legislators had not been indifferent to persons with such disabilities,
passing legislation in the form of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and
the Education of the Handicapped Act, which were meant to more
fully integrate persons with disabilities in society.8 4 Third, persons
with intellectual disabilities were not politically powerless.8 5 Finally,
the Court was concerned about expanding heightened scrutiny to
other types of disabilities.86
Nonetheless, the group home still prevailed because the city zon-
ing law that disallowed the group home failed to survive rational ba-
sis review.8 7 As the Court wrote, "The short of it is that requiring the
permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice
against the mentally retarded."8 8 Commentators and some dissenting
Justices have argued, however, that a standard of review higher than
rational basis was used in this case.89
Based on the reasoning in City of Cleburne, allegations of equal
protection violations on behalf of persons with severe brain injury
82. Id. at 438 (citation omitted).
83. Id. at 442 ("[T]hose who are mentally retarded have a reduced ability to cope with
and function in the everyday world. . . . They are thus different, immutably so, in relevant
respects, and the States' interest in dealing with and providing for them is plainly a legiti-
mate one.").
84. Id. at 443-44.
85. Id. at 445 ("[T]he legislative response, which could hardly have occurred and sur-
vived without public support, negates any claim that the mentally retarded are politically
powerless in the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of the lawmakers.").
86. Id. at 445 ("[I]f the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were
deemed quasi-suspect . . . it would be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a va-
riety of other groups who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting them off from others,
who cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative responses, and who can claim some
degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at large.").
87. Id. at 446 ("Our refusal to recognize the retarded as a quasi-suspect class does not
leave them entirely unprotected from invidious discrimination. To withstand equal protec-
tion review, legislation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and others must
be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.").
88. Id. at 450. Laws based on animus will not survive rational basis review. Yoshino,
supra note 74, at 760.
89. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("[T]he Court's heightened-scrutiny discussion is even more puzzling
given that Cleburne's ordinance is invalidated only after being subjected to precisely the
sort of probing inquiry associated with heightened scrutiny.").
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would likely fail. 0 Indeed, legal scholars have argued that the Su-
preme Court over time has been limiting the power of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
However, given recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, as delineat-
ed in Obergefell v. Hodges,9 2 equal protection doctrine seems less re-
strictive. Indeed, in Justice Kennedy's Obergefell opinion, he relied on
both the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses when finding a
fundamental right for same-sex couples to be married, even though
gays and lesbians are not a suspect class.9 3 Justice Kennedy wrote
that "new dimensions of freedom become apparent to new genera-
tions" and that "new insights and societal understandings can reveal
unjustified inequality within . . . fundamental institutions that once
passed unnoticed and unchallenged."94
Given the evolving and unsettled equal protection doctrine, courts
may be open to a heightened level of scrutiny for laws that treat per-
sons with disabilities differently from others, and may be sympathet-
ic to Justice Marshall's arguments (in his City of Cleburne concur-
rence in part and dissent in part) about the situation of persons with
intellectual disabilities: "[T]he mentally retarded have been subject
to a 'lengthy and tragic history' of segregation and discrimination
that can only be called grotesque. . . . State laws deemed the retarded
'unfit for citizenship.' "9 This situation resembles that experienced
by persons with disorders of consciousness, as has been documented
elsewhere.9 6 An important difference between the "mentally retard-
ed" and persons with disorders of consciousness, however, is that the
latter condition is not immutable.
The likelihood of success asserting constitutional claims on behalf
of persons with severe brain injury is low given the state action re-
quirement, the constitutional emphasis on negative rights, and the
current rational basis review of claims of equal protection violation
90. Even if the claims did not fail, however, one disadvantage of equal protection
claims is that the state can always respond by leveling or equalizing down and eliminating
entitlements for all rather than including entitlements for more. See Yoshino, supra note
74, at 800.
91. See, e.g., id. at 748 ("Over the past decades, the Court has systematically denied
constitutional protection to new groups, curtailed it for already covered groups, and limited
Congress's capacity to protect groups through civil rights legislation." (footnote omitted));
Imoukhuede, supra note 76, at 491-92 (describing a move toward liberty-based claims ra-
ther than equality-based claims).
92. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
93. Id. at 2604-05.
94. Id. at 2596, 2603.
95. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 461, 463 (1985) (Marshall,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
96. See generally FINS, BRAIN INJURY, supra note 1; Wright & Fins, supra note 62.
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for persons with disabilities. Fortunately, however, other sources of
federal law, such as the ADA, are more promising. These laws help
interpret the constitutional values of equality and dignity.9 7
B. Disability Discrimination Statutes and Case Law
Given the limits of constitutional claims on behalf of persons with
disabilities, statutes with the express purpose of protecting persons
with disabilities from discrimination are a more promising avenue for
rectifying the unjust treatment of persons with severe brain injury,98
who are, by any statutory definition, disabled.9 9 The most important
of these statutes are the Rehabilitation Act'00 and the ADA' 0' and its
subsequent amendments,0 2 all of which strive to ensure the social
equality and dignity of persons with disabilities.
1. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 states: "No otherwise
qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in
section 7(6), shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving Federal finan-
cial assistance."10 3
This section is considered to be the first civil rights statute for
persons with disabilities.10 4 In fact, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964105 was the model for section 504, and "disabled people [benefit-
ted] from the previous efforts and political strength of the broader
racial civil rights movement."06 One major benefit of linking disabil-
ity rights with civil rights is that economic cost considerations of fully
97. AHARON BARAK, HUMAN DIGNITY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE AND THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL RIGHT 205 (2015) (arguing that dignity is a value, but not a right, in the U.S.
Constitution).
98. See ROTHSTEIN & MCGINLEY, supra note 61, at 9, 25.
99. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012) ("The term 'disability' means, with respect to
an individual-(A) a physical or mental impairment hat substantially limits one or more
major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being
regarded as having such an impairment. . . .").
100. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 700-796 (2012)).
101. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012)).
102. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
103. 29 U.S.C. § 794.
104. SCOTCH, supra note 64, at 3.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
106. SCOTCH, supra note 64, at 142; see also Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with
Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 393, 410 (1991).
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including persons with disabilities in society become less relevant.0 7
The major limitation of section 504, however, is that it only applies to
entities receiving federal funds, which includes hospitals and
healthcare providers that accept Medicare or Medicaid, 'os but ex-
cludes much of the private sector.09
2. Americans with Disabilities Act and Olmstead Enforcement
The ADA" 0 rectified this limitation of section 504."' The goal of
the ADA is to prohibit discrimination against and promote the full
inclusion of persons with disabilities in society,"2 and to this end ap-
plies to both the public and private sector.113 The ADA has both posi-
tive duties (to accommodate) and negative duties (to not discrimi-
nate).114 Title I of the ADA regulates employment;"5 Title II regulates
state and local government;" and Title III regulates public accom-
modations and commercial facilities. "' Employers, state and local
107. Unlike other groups of marginalized persons, persons with disabilities may re-
quire additional resources to achieve equality, and equal treatment may not be sufficient
for full integration in society. SCOTCH, supra note 64, at 11. As one scholar has noted:
Characterizing access as a civil right had distinct political advantages. To por-
tray access as another government benefit for disabled people . . . would have
defined improved access as desirable but not as a social imperative. Allowing
disabled people greater participation thus would become an essentially chari-
table act. In periods of limited resources, which is to say virtually always, it is
politically acceptable to limit benevolent acts of charity because of budgetary
constraints, traditional practice, or administrative difficulty. Reducing benefits
may be legitimate, while violating rights is not.
Id. at 41-42.
108. ROTHSTEIN & MCGINLEY, supra note 61, at 353, 655-56.
109. Id. at 7-8.
110. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012).
111. Nancy Lee Jones, Overview and Essential Requirements of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 471, 475-76 (1991) ("A key rationale used to support the
ADA was that it essentially extended into the private sector an existing federal statute.").
112. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) ("[T]he Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with
disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and
economic self-sufficiency for such individuals . . . .").
113. See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Equal Members of the Community": The Public Ac-
commodations Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 551, 554-
56 (1991) (describing how prior to the ADA, public accommodations that could not discrim-
inate on the basis of other status characteristics could do so on the basis of disability).
114. Linda Hamilton Krieger, Introduction to BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTER-
PRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS 5 (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003).
115. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117.
116. Id. §§ 12131-12165. Indeed, the ADA "reaches virtually every state and local pub-
lic service regardless of whether the program receives federal financial assistance." ROTH-
STEIN & MCGINLEY, supra note 61, at 354. State and local governments that receive federal
funds are also subject to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Id.
117. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189.
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governments, and public accommodations have defenses to ADA im-
plementation of nondiscrimination mandates. One is that making an
accommodation would fundamentally alter their program." The oth-
er is that making an accommodation would be overly financially bur-
densome and thus "unreasonable.""1 Accordingly, for there to be un-
lawful discrimination under the ADA, a reasonable accommodation
must be possible.'
The majority of the lawsuits brought under the ADA are Title I
lawsuits regarding employment discrimination,2' and thus this area
of disability law is much more developed than other areas, such as
healthcare.2 2 For many persons with severe brain injury, however,
Title I is likely less relevant, given that the nature of the disability
may prevent the person from being able to work.12 3 Instead, Title 11124
and Title 111125 are more promising sources of law for ending the in-
stitutionalization of persons with severe brain injury and increasing
access to technologies that will aid in community living, 2 6 as together
these sections of the ADA regulate the provision of both public and
private healthcare.2 7
A central focus of both section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and
the ADA is deinstitutionalizing persons with disabilities who can live
in community settings if their needs are accommodated. 2 8 An explicit
goal of the ADA is for persons with disabilities to have services pro-
118. See id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.303 (2017).
119. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). These defenses are considered on a case-by-case
basis. An example of an unreasonable accommodation in the workplace is requesting to
have no contact with co-workers. Ronda K. O'Donnell & Lee C. Durivage, Undue Hardship,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (June 14, 2011, 12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/
almID/1202496644549 [https:/perma.cc/CF63-FLYX].
120. ROTHSTEIN & MCGINLEY, supra note 61, at 83.
121. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111.
122. ROTHSTEIN & MCGINLEY, supra note 61, at vi. While more developed, this area of
law has tended to not be very favorable to disabled plaintiffs. Krieger, supra note 114, at 8-
10. Congress responded to this by amending the ADA and overriding Supreme Court deci-
sions that narrowly defined disability. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
325, § 2(b), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). This has not changed much in the employment context.
Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes Under the ADA Amend-
ments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2041-43 (2013).
123. We do not write off the relevance of Title I, however, because given appropriate
assistive devices and reasonable accommodations, many persons with severe brain injury
may be able to work.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
125. Id. § 12182(a).
126. Wright & Fins, supra note 62, at 236 (arguing this point).
127. ROTHSTEIN & MCGINLEY, supra note 61, at 353. Healthcare facilities are places of
public accommodation and are covered by Title III of ADA; if they receive federal grants,
they are also covered by section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 265.
128. Id. at 634.
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vided in the most integrated setting possible.'"2 The leading Supreme
Court case interpreting Title II of the ADA, Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel.
Zimring, was a case that asked whether the ADA's nondiscrimination
mandate required community-based housing rather than institution-
alization.130 The Court answered with a "qualified yes," explaining
that
Such action is in order when the State's treatment professionals
have determined that community placement is appropriate, the
transfer from institutional care to a less restrictive setting is not
opposed by the affected individual, and the placement can be rea-
sonably accommodated, taking into account the resources available
to the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities.131
Since this case, deinstitutionalization lawsuits have become
known as Olmstead enforcement cases, 132 and many consider
Olmstead to be the disability community's equivalent of Brown v.
Board of Education.13 3
Achieving deinstitutionalization and community integration of
persons with significant disabilities has proven difficult, however.
The most significant barrier to deinstitutionalization is inadequate
resources, including "funding, placements, and trained staffing ... in
the community."34 If community-based living facilities do not exist,
then it is impossible to deinstitutionalize.13 5
While it may seem as though the existing disability rights laws
should be modified in some way to address the particular problems
facing persons with severe brain injury described above, we believe
that the current laws, along with reforms of other bodies of law, are
sufficient if applied and enforced to aid in community reintegration of
persons with severe brain injury. Indeed, we have argued elsewhere
129. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(B) ("Goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations shall be afforded to an individual with a disability in the most integrated
setting appropriate to the needs of the individual.").
130. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
131. Id. at 587.
132. See Disabilities, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
issues/disabilities [https://perma.cc/8XL6-M5G2] (summarizing Olmstead enforcement
during the Obama Administration).
133. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Justice Ginsburg and the Judi-
cial Role in Expanding "We the People": The Disability Rights Cases, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
49, 49 (2004).
134. ROTHSTEIN & MCGINLEY, supra note 61, at 634.
135. Id. As Rothstein and McGinley note about "community services and access to inde-
pendent living," the most significant problem for advocates is not winning nondiscrimination
lawsuits, but instead "funding deficiencies." Id. at 9; see also Bagenstos, supra note 133, at
59 (explaining that budget cuts have slowed Olmstead community integration efforts).
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that Olmsteadl36 is relevant in the case of persons with disorders of
consciousness who are institutionalized in custodial care and that
such isolation and segregation is a violation of the Olmstead integra-
tion mandate if the facilities are public, and can be considered a vio-
lation by analogy if the facilities are private.13 7 Furthermore, if such
persons do not receive accommodations in the form of access to drugs,
devices, and rehabilitation, this may be a violation of the ADA's regu-
lations that require that persons with disabilities be given auxiliary
aids and services to assist in communication.138
Persons with severe brain injury who are unlawfully institutional-
ized and denied reasonable accommodations can sue for injunctive
relief under Title III of the ADA.1 39 While healthcare providers can
always raise fundamental alteration or undue burden defenses, 140
they are unlikely to be successful in this context given that many
healthcare facilities already have the necessary technologies-many
of which are inexpensive-and just need to consistently make them
available to persons with severe brain injury.141
Enforcing section 504 and the ADA remains crucial to ensuring
equality and full inclusion for persons with a disability. However,
other scholars have noted that "[m]any laws passed by Congress have
little or no impact in the absence of stipulated enforcement mecha-
nisms and administrative support." 42 Indeed, there is currently an
extensive ADA enforcement docket.143 As one example of Olmstead
136. 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999).
137. Wright & Fins, supra note 62, at 271-72 (asserting that the reasoning of Olmstead
can be applied to Title III cases).
138. 28 C.F.R. § 36.303 (2017). In previous work, some of us have noted that reasonable
accommodations or modifications is unclear and vague, especially in the context of disor-
ders of consciousness. Wright & Fins, supra note 62, at 269-70; see also Alex B. Long, In-
troducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: Assessing the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 228-29 (2008) (describing how
even after the passage of the ADAAA, there is still a lack of guidance about what reasona-
ble accommodation means). If given access to reasonable accommodations, persons with
severe brain injury may be able to work, and then Title I of the ADA would apply.
139. Wright & Fins, supra note 62, at 272-73 (discussing this argument in the context
of the MCS, but it is more broadly applicable to persons with severe brain injury).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2012).
141. See also Wright & Fins, supra note 62, at 270-71, 275-77 (addressing cost counter-
arguments). Cost is not likely to be an issue because some technologies are rather cheap
and because the capital equipment already exists in many facilities. Also, it is not a given
that costs will increase, if providing accommodations reduces other large costs. Regardless,
cost cannot be a huge consideration ethically. Id.; see also Dalia B. Taylor, Note, Communi-
cating with Vegetative State Patients: The Role of Neuroimaging in American Disability
Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1451, 1468-69 (2014) (describing guidance related to cost considera-
tions as applied to this population who needs access to neurotechnologies).
142. SCOTCH, supra note 64, at 142.




enforcement, the Justice Department has found that South Dakota
has been violating the rights of persons with disabilities by placing
them in nursing homes to receive needed medical care rather than
providing care in the community.'44 More importantly for the purpos-
es of this Article, there has been litigation in Massachusetts about
the medically unnecessary institutionalization of persons with brain
injury in nursing homes.14 5 Such litigation was settled, with the state
promising to deinstitutionalize this population.146 However, the set-
tlement had to be amended because the state was unable to fulfill its
promise.14 7 Little material progress has been made, and persons with
severe brain injury continue to be marginalized.148
We advocate for class action lawsuits on behalf of persons with
severe brain injury alleging ADA and Olmstead violations, similar to
the lawsuit that resulted in a settlement in Massachusetts.149 How-
ever, it may be preferable for future litigation to result in a "judicial
opinion that [has] significant precedential value," 150 perhaps an
Olmstead equivalent for the severely brain injured, rather than a set-
tlement.15 1 This is difficult for plaintiffs, however, who initiate law-
suits for immediate remedies rather than symbolic victories and may
accept a settlement for less than they could attain through litiga-
tion.15 2 However, as can be seen in the Massachusetts case, settle-
144. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., UNITED STATES' INVESTIGATION, PURSU-
ANT TO THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, OF SOUTH DAKOTA'S USE OF NURSING FA-
CILITIES TO SERVE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES (2016).
145. Hutchinson ex rel. Julien v. Patrick, 636 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011).
146. Final Comprehensive Settlement Agreement at 1-4, Patrick, 636 F.3d 1 (No. 07-
CV-30084-MAP).
147. See Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Amended Settlement Agreement, for
Approval of a Notice to the Class, and for Scheduling of a Fairness Hearing, Patrick, 636
F.3d 1 (No. 07-CV-30084-MAP); Proposed Order Approving Amended Settlement Agreement,
Patrick, 636 F.3d 1 (No. 07-CV-30084-MAP) (approving amended settlement agreement).




149. A class action lawsuit with well-supported named plaintiffs may aid in one prob-
lem with litigation on behalf of persons with severe brain injury: the inability to advocate
for themselves. See SCOTCH, supra note 64, at 12 (describing this in the case of disability
generally). It may be difficult to initiate Title III lawsuits, however, given that monetary
damages are not possible when private parties file suit. Ruth Colker, ADA Title III: A Frag-
ile Compromise, 21 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 377, 378 (2000). Absent such a possibility,
there may not be incentive for individuals to bring suit.
150. MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCA-
TION, 1925-1950, at 61 (1st ed. 1987).
151. See also Wright & Fins, supra note 62, at 278-79 (describing the benefits of success-
ful litigation on behalf of persons with MCS, and in particular, that such litigation can force
compliance from other actors, who are not parties to lawsuits and want to avoid lawsuits).
152. TUSHNET, supra note 150, at 81-82.
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ments require ongoing enforcement and may promise more than they
can deliver. Finally, even if class action litigation is unsuccessful in
obtaining a verdict for the plaintiffs, it may nevertheless motivate
the legislature-either state or federal-to take action on behalf of
this population.15 3
C. Affordable Care Act
When the ACA 5 4 was passed, many anticipated that this legisla-
tion would have far-reaching positive impacts on the lives of persons
with disabilities.5 5 As some scholars wrote, what the ACA does is "in-
troduce a federally uniform meaning to the concept of coverage, at
least in the individual and small group markets, with a particular
focus on the integrity of such coverage for persons with disabilities
and serious health conditions."'"5 The most important ways in which
the ACA influences medical care for persons with disabilities are by
increasing the numbers of persons who have health insurance through
subsidizing healthcare and expanding Medicaid programs, mandating
coverage of certain benefits, and prohibiting discrimination.
The future of the ACA is uncertain, however.'5 7 At the time of this
writing, the ACA has not yet been repealed or amended, although
these actions are still a priority for some members of the Republican-
controlled Congress. The ACA was instrumental in bringing persons
with disabilities out of the shadows, and a repeal is likely to be regres-
sive, pushing persons with disabilities back to the margins of society.
1. Nondiscrimination
The ACA prohibits health insurers from discriminating against
persons with disabilities and chronic health conditions. 158 Some
scholars have noted that in this respect the ACA may do more to
153. Ryan, supra note 60, at 97-98.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2012).
155. See, e.g., Sara Rosenbaum, Joel B. Teitelbaum & Katherine Hayes, Crossing the
Rubicon: The Impact of the Affordable Care Act on the Content of Insurance Coverage for
Persons with Disabilities, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 527, 561-62 (2011).
Indeed, some scholars even asserted that the ACA was a piece of legislation that interpret-
ed the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution to guarantee a positive right to
healthcare. Rubin, supra note 68, at 1701, 1704-05.
156. Rosenbaum, Teitelbaum & Hayes, supra note 155, at 530.
157. Jonathan Oberlander, The End of Obamacare, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1 (2017)
(discussing all of the steps a Trump Administration could take to chip away at the ACA
and how Congress will likely repeal it, but what, if anything would replace it, is unknown).
158. Rosenbaum, Teitelbaum & Hayes, supra note 155; Disabilities, supra note 132;
Douglas Jacobs & Wayne Turner, Nondiscrimination and Chronic Conditions-The Final




bring persons with disabilities into society than disability legislation
itself.'5 9 This is because the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA still
permit insurers to discriminate against persons with disabilities ac-
tuarially as long as they do not refuse to sell insurance to them, while
the ACA prohibits this. 6 0 Insurers cannot deny coverage to persons
because they have "preexisting conditions," for example.'6 ' This mat-
ters for persons with severe brain injury because it means that any
gaps in insurance coverage will not prevent them from later being
insured or having health problems associated with their injury cov-
ered by insurance. Given that brain injuries often lead to chronic
problems, disability advocates should fight any future changes to the
ACA that alter this guarantee of nondiscrimination.
2. Essential Health Benefits
The ACA mandates that insurance plans sold on the exchanges
provide ten essential health benefits.'6 2 These essential health bene-
fits have the effect of creating a national health insurance minimum
standard, and include the critical category of Rehabilitation and Ha-
bilitation-a benefit that was lobbied for, in part, by Gabrielle
Giffords, who was afforded extensive rehabilitation after surviving a
gunshot wound to the head only because it was covered by workers'
compensation.16 3 It is unclear what the impact of this health benefit
will be, however, given that it is unknown what kind of rehabilitative
services will be considered essential.164 The ACA deferred to the Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to define the content of
the ten essential health benefits.165 The Secretary requested a report
from the Institute of Medicine, which recommended that these "bene-
fits . . . be modeled after a typical small employer plan," but ensuring
that every category is included and that there is no discrimination. '6 6
The Secretary of HHS then gave the states discretion to define these
benefits by selecting a benchmark insurance plan available in their
159. See, e.g., Rosenbaum, Teitelbaum & Hayes, supra note 155, at 562.
160. Id.
161. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2012).
162. See id. § 18022(b)(1).
163. Lena Groeger, Giffords May Get Better Brain-Injury Care Than Most of Her Con-
stituents, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 17, 2012, 9:49 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/
giffords-may-get-better-brain-injury-care-than-most-of-her-constituents [https://perma.cc/XWT2-
6GDW].
164. Joseph W. Boninger, Bruce M. Gans & Leighton Chan, Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act: Potential Effects on Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, 93 AR-
CHIVES PHYSICAL MED. & REHAB. 929, 930 (2012).
165. Id.; see also Rosenbaum, Teitelbaum & Hayes, supra note 155, at 555; Hill, supra
note 69, at 451 (describing the process of defining the essential health benefits).
166. Boninger, Gans & Chan, supra note 164, at 930.
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state. '6 This lessens the intended uniform health insurance stand-
ard. Additionally, physical medicine and rehabilitation is currently a
"shortage specialty," so there may not be enough physiatrists to
meet demand.'6
Less obviously important than the required rehabilitation cover-
age is mandatory coverage for chronic disease treatment. There is an
emerging medical consensus that persons with moderate/severe TBI
who require rehabilitation can acquire "a lifelong health condition
termed chronic brain injury (CBI). CBI impairs the brain and other
organ systems and may persist or progress over an individual's life
span. CBI must be identified and proactively managed as a lifelong
condition to improve health, independent function and participation
in society."'6 9 Given this change in understanding and the costs asso-
ciated with decline, some scholars argue that TBI should be consid-
ered a chronic health condition and speculate that disease manage-
ment can "improve outcomes and reduce costs" by "prevention or de-
lay of complications through early detection and intervention."'
There may be opportunities under the ACA to target CBI, particu-
larly through grant/funding mechanisms. But the ACA currently con-
ceptualizes the treatment of chronic conditions as interventions such
as diabetes management, smoking cessation, and cancer screen-
ings."' Therefore, advocates for persons with severe brain injury may
need to analogize CBI to these other types of conditions and assert
the importance of preventative care in the case of TBI.
3. Changes to Medicaid
While repealing some parts of the ACA such as the exchanges and
subsidies is likely, it may be more politically difficult to repeal the
Medicaid eligibility expansion, given that the states that took ad-
vantage of it probably do not want to give up those funds.7 2 It re-
mains to be seen how other Medicaid programs affected by the ACA
will be impacted should the ACA be repealed.
The ACA created new Medicaid programs and increased funding
for existing grant programs. In particular, the ACA contains several
167. Id. Many large group plans will already have many of these benefits, except
habilitation.
168. Id.
169. John D. Corrigan & Flora M. Hammond, Traumatic Brain Injury As a Chronic
Health Condition, 94 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. & REHAB. 1199, 1199 (2013).
170. Id. at 1200.
171. See, e.g., Health Homes, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/1tss/
health-homes/index.html [https://perma.cc/SGX9-P5BY] (describing chronic conditions
listed in the statute but noting that other chronic conditions may be approved by CMS).
172. Oberlander, supra note 157, at 3.
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incentives to help states build better long-term services and supports
systems (LTSS). LTSS is defined as "assistance with activities of dai-
ly living" provided to "people [who] cannot perform these activities on
their own because of a physical, cognitive, or chronic health condition
that is expected to continue for an extended period of time, typically
ninety days or more."173
Most persons who require LTSS use Medicaid.174 Although persons
with disabilities who need LTSS have always preferred to receive care
in their homes or communities, the United States has a long history of
institutionalizing such persons instead.'7 5 When Medicaid was first
created, "the only mandatory coverage of long-term services and sup-
ports was that provided in skilled nursing facilities.""'7 There began to
be a transition to home and community-based services when Congress
created waivers for Medicaid, 1' and after Olmstead, there was a
mandate for states to provide LTSS to persons in the least restrictive
environment,7 8 but this care is often not available or affordable.
Since the Great Recession, states have cut funding for LTSS,'7 9
and thus state Medicaid programs are placing persons with disabili-
ties in nursing homes when community- or home-based care would be
more appropriate.8 0 While states do want to provide care to persons
with disabilities in their homes and communities because this is
more cost-effective and persons with disabilities would prefer not to
be institutionalized,'8 ' there are insufficient community-based facili-
ties (or public funding is not available to pay for care in such facili-
ties).8 2 Advocates for persons who need LTSS recommend that state
Medicaid programs pay family caregivers so that care can be provid-
ed in the home, or provide transportation for people who receive
173. Susan C. Reinhard, Enid Kassner & Ari Houser, How the Affordable Care Act Can
Help Move States Toward a High-Performing System of Long-Term Services and Supports,
30 HEALTH AFF. 447, 449 (2011).
174. Id. at 447.
175. Mary D. Naylor et al., An Assessment of State-Led Reform of Long-Term Services
and Supports, 40 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 531, 537 (2015).
176. Reinhard, Kassner & Houser, supra note 173, at 452.
177. See also id. ("But in 1981 Congress allowed states to waive certain federal re-
quirements in order to increase their ability to provide home and community-based ser-
vices to people who would otherwise have to be in a nursing home.").
178. See Naylor et al., supra note 175, at 542.
179. The proportion of spending on LTSS to total Medicaid spending is high, so budget
cuts focus on LTSS. Id. at 533.
180. Reinhard, Kassner & Houser, supra note 173, at 449; see also Naylor et al., supra note
175, at 542-43 (discussing financial barriers to Olmstead enforcement and deinstitutionalization).
181. Reinhard, Kassner & Houser, supra note 173, at 448.
182. Id. at 450.
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LTSS outside of the home, so they can remain connected to their
communities. 183
In order to address the problem of over-institutionalizing persons
with disabilities, the ACA created the Community First Option, the
Balancing Incentives Payment Program, and Medicaid "health
homes," as well as extended the existing Money Follows the Person
(MFP) grant. The Community First Option increases the amount of
federal funding for Medicaid in states that "offer person-centered
home and community-based services."8 4 The Balancing Incentives
Payment Program is targeted at states that use nursing homes ra-
ther than community- or home-based options to provide LTSS, and
increases federal Medicaid funding if states change how they ap-
proach long-term care.'8 5 Medicaid health homes are for persons who
have multiple chronic health conditions or at least one chronic health
condition and are at risk for another; the program is meant to coordi-
nate care that treats the "whole person."1 8 6
The MFP grant program existed prior to the ACA,' but the ACA
extended the length of the grant program and allotted more funding
for these "grants that help move people out of institutions or avoid
unwanted institutionalization"' and "change state policies so that
Medicaid funds for long-term care services and supports can 'follow
the person' to the setting of his or her choice.""' An evaluation of
MFP reveals that 45 state grants have transitioned over 50,000 Med-
icaid recipients to the community between 2008 and 2014.10
183. Id.
184. Id. at 451; see also Community First Choice (CFC) 1915 (k), MEDICAID.GOV,
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/hcbs/authorities/1915-k/index.html [https://perma.cc/3QU8-
S2ZT].
185. Reinhard, Kassner & Houser, supra note 173, at 451; see also Balancing Incentive
Program, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/ltss/balancing/incentive/
index.html [https://perma.cc/HCU9-NLXY].
186. Health Homes, supra note 171.
187. See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006).
188. Reinhard, Kassner & Houser, supra note 173, at 451; see also Money Follows
the Person, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/ltss/money-follows-the-
person/index.html [https://perma.cc/RG6B-CJKH].
189. NOELLE DENNY-BROWN ET AL., MATHEMATICA POL'Y RESEARCH, THE RIGHT SUP-
PORTS AT THE RIGHT TIME: How MONEY FOLLOWS THE PERSON PROGRAMS ARE SUPPORTING
DIVERSE POPULATIONS IN THE COMMUNITY 2 (2015), https://www.mathematica-mpr.com/our-
publications-and-findings/publications/the-right-supports-at-the-right-time-how-money-
follows-the-person-programs-are-supporting-diverse [https://perma.cc/4ESD-R3LP].
190. Id. at 3 (citing MELISSA MEDEIROS ET AL., MONEY FOLLOWS THE PERSON DEMON-
STRATION: OVERVIEW OF STATE GRANTEE PROGRESS, JANUARY To DECEMBER 2014 (2015)).
It is beyond the scope of this Article to detail all the differences between state Medicaid




While funding is still available, states that have not yet applied
for such grants or created these programs should do so in order to
increase noninstitutional options for providing LTSS to persons with
chronic conditions and disabilities. Should states receive funding and
create programs, advocates for persons with disabilities should con-
tinue to pressure the states to ensure that such programs are high
quality, successful, and sustainable.
Given that persons with severe brain injury often need LTSS,
which may be paid for by Medicaid, they are likely more susceptible
to unnecessary institutionalization, something that the above-
described programs attempt to reduce. Advocates for persons with
severe brain injury should, therefore, lobby Congress to continue
funding these programs, even if the ACA is repealed and replaced.
Furthermore, advocates should lobby for TBI and CBI to be consid-
ered chronic health conditions for the purposes of establishing a Med-
icaid health home. Currently, the statute does not mention severe
brain injury.'' However, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Ser-
vices has the authority and discretion to permit Medicaid health
homes for individuals with other chronic conditions not listed in the
statute. 112
D. Statutes and Regulations for Subpopulations of
Persons with Severe Brain Injury
Persons with severe brain injury are a diverse group. Some are
school-aged, while others are adults. Some acquired their brain inju-
ry while serving in the U.S. Armed Forces. Some could benefit from
access to cutting-edge drugs and assistive devices. Some access
healthcare through Medicare. Below, we discuss federal statutes and
regulations that address certain categories of persons with severe
brain injury to determine how these could be leveraged to more fully
include persons with severe brain injury in civil society.
In the above Sections, we have discussed rights-constitutional
and statutory. However, political theorists and ethicists are increas-
ingly focusing on the importance of capabilities as a supplement to
rights. The political theorist Sridhar Venkatapuram,19 3 drawing upon
the work of Martha Nussbaum94 and Amartya Sen,'95 has noted that
191. See Health Homes, supra note 171.
192. See id.
193. SRIDHAR VENKATAPURAM, HEALTH JUSTICE: AN ARGUMENT FROM THE CAPABILI-
TIES APPROACH (2011).
194. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AP-
PROACH (2013).
195. AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1999).
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rights can only be achieved in a supportive and enabling context that
allows individuals the opportunity (and capability) to be healthy and
pursue a life plan.9 6 For those who have sustained a severe brain in-
jury and who have to adapt and modify their life plan, this requires
access to those interventions, drugs, and devices that make adapta-
tion and resilience possible.
In this Section, we begin by continuing to address rights in the
context of statutes directed toward the needs of veterans with TBI.
But we then address three essential instrumentalities that constitute
important means that can enable recovery and promote resilience
from severe brain injury, and in the process, promote essential capa-
bilities such as health, bodily integrity, consciousness, affiliation, and
control over one's environment.9 7 These instrumentalities are educa-
tion, rehabilitation, and assistive devices.
To address the first intervention of education, we consider how the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) may assist mi-
nors with severe brain injury receive an education, which is essential
to maximizing capabilities. To address the second intervention of re-
habilitation, we will consider how Medicare regulations can dictate
the extent and nature of access to rehabilitation, which may be nec-
essary to realize consciousness, which underlies many capabilities.
To consider the intervention of devices, we will outline some of the
current challenges faced by researchers who are attempting to utilize
neuromodulation and deep brain stimulation as a plausible treat-
ment for severe brain injury.
1. Veterans with Severe Brain Injury
One special population of persons with severe brain injury is vet-
erans; particularly, veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
where the signature war injury is TBI. 98 Some estimate that about
235,000 Armed Forces personnel have sustained a TBI since 2000,'99
and these injuries often require extensive and expensive medical care
followed by long-term rehabilitation. In this Section, we survey the
actions of Congress and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in
196. Joseph J. Fins, Health Justice: An Argument from the Capabilities Approach, 307
J. Am. MED. ASS'N 2106 (2012) (book review).
197. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 194.
198. Daisy Yuhas, Veterans of Iraq, Afghanistan Show Brain Changes Related to
Explosion Exposure, SCI. AM. (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.scientificamerican.com/
article/veterans-of-iraq-afghanistan-show-brain-changes-related-to-explosion-exposure
[https://perma.cclGA3U-5J7X].
199. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION ET AL., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY IN THE UNITED STATES: UNDERSTANDING THE PUBLIC HEALTH
PROBLEM AMONG CURRENT AND FORMER MILITARY PERSONNEL 54 (2013).
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response to the problems faced by veterans with TBI, and conclude
that the VA has not successfully addressed the health needs of veter-
ans with TBI, despite the congressional mandate to do so.
Congress has acknowledged the severity of the social and health
problems associated with veterans returning from war through ex-
tensive legislation meant to aid the VA in responding to this crisis.
Much of this legislation has been broad in focus, and all of the legis-
lation mandates reports to Congress on the VA's progress in meeting
the needs of veterans.
One early piece of such legislation was the Veterans Health Pro-
grams Improvement Act of 2004, the primary purpose of which was
"to increase the authorization of appropriations for grants to benefit
homeless veterans, [and] to improve programs for management and
administration of veterans' facilities and health care programs."2 0 0 As
part of this particular legislation, Congress mandated reports about
the recruitment and retention of rehabilitation nurses and waiting
times for veterans to receive care .2 0 While this legislation is about
healthcare broadly, its aims, if realized, also benefit veterans with
TBI who need quick access to healthcare and rehabilitation.
Other legislation has focused specifically on the needs of veterans
with TBI and their family caregivers. Some of this legislation has
called for longitudinal studies on veterans with TBI;2 0 2 creation of
programs that train family caregivers and also provide technical as-
sistance, respite, lodging, health care, and a stipend for them; and
reports on the creation and evaluation of these programs.2 03 And in
2008, Congress mandated the creation of a "Comprehensive Plan on
Prevention, Diagnosis, Mitigation, Treatment, and Rehabilitation of,
and Research on, Traumatic Brain Injury, Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder, and Other Mental Health Conditions," part of which re-
quired reports on TBI Centers of Excellence; how much money is
spent on TBI; progress and priorities on TBI; and the status of com-
munity integration of and rehabilitation for veterans with TBI. 20 4
Most recently, Congress passed the Veterans Access, Choice, and
Accountability Act of 2014, allotting money to create a database on
patient wait times, outcomes, and quality of care received in VA facil-
200. Veterans Health Programs Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-422, 118
Stat. 2379 (2004).
201. Id. §§ 501(d), 604.
202. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L.
No. 109-364, § 721, 120 Stat. 2294 (2006).
203. Caregivers and Veterans Omnibus Health Services Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
163, § 203(a), 124 Stat. 1143 (2010).
204. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181,
§ 1618, 122 Stat. 450 (2008).
2018] 341
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ities in an attempt to increase transparency.0 5 Additionally, the Act
extended a program to assess "the ffectiveness of providing assisted
living services to eligible Veterans with traumatic brain injuries to
'enhance the rehabilitation, quality of life, and community integra-
tion of such Veterans.' "206
Given reports that veterans were not receiving adequate care at
the VA, however, we were not satisfied that legislation alone was suf-
ficient for veterans to obtain the medical and rehabilitative care they
needed. In previous research, we attempted to evaluate the impact of
this legislation.2 07 However, we found that the reports mandated by
Congress were inaccessible and/or nonexistent. It would appear that
the VA has been utterly unresponsive to Congress's demand for an ac-
counting of the scope of the problem of veterans with TBI, the actions
that the VA has taken to address these veterans' needs, and the suc-
cess of such actions, as well as gaps that still need to be addressed.20
Veterans with TBI do not need more legislation. Congress need
only properly manage the VA by demanding that the agency fulfill its
responsibility to veterans with TBI, as outlined in the legislation de-
scribed above, and appropriate funds necessary for all of the pro-
grams Congress outlined.2 09
We would now suggest that immense public pressure be brought
to bear on Congress and the VA to fulfill the letter and spirit of this
extensive legislation and give veterans with severe brain injury the
medical care and rehabilitative treatment they need to be more fully
integrated in society. Citizens should call their congressional repre-
sentatives and demand action.210
2. Children with Severe Brain Injury and Access to Education
The IDEA seeks "to ensure that all children with disabilities have
available to them a free [and] appropriate public education that em-
205. Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-146, 128
Stat. 1754 (2014).
206. U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF., SUMMARY: VETERANS ACCESS, CHOICE AND AC-
COUNTABILITY ACT OF 2014 ("CHOICE ACT") 2, https://www.va.gov/opa/choiceact/documents/
choice-act-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/CK4D-6LLD].
207. Michael R. Ulrich et al., Lincoln's Promise: Congress, Veterans, and Traumatic
Brain Injury, HASTINGS CTR. (June 21, 2016), http://www.thehastingscenter.org/lincolns-
promise-congress-veterans-and-traumatic-brain-injury/ [https://perma.cc/VFF3-HHAX].
208. Id.
209. See also COMM'N ON CARE, FINAL REPORT 2, 242 tbl.F-7 (2016),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/sitesusa/wp-content/uploads/sites/912/2016/07/Commission-on-
CareFinal-Report_063016_FOR-WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/94US-678Z] (reporting that
access to health care is a problem for veterans, especially those in rural areas).
210. Our easily accessible prior work also can be distributed on social media. Ulrich et
al., supra note 207.
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phasizes special education and related services designed to meet
their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employ-
ment, and independent living."2 1' The Act was originally passed in
1975 as the Education for All Handicapped Children Act after a con-
gressional investigation found that the majority of children with dis-
abilities "were either totally excluded from schools or sitting idly in
regular classrooms awaiting the time when they were old enough to
'drop out.' "212 The IDEA creates a kind of contract between the feder-
al government and the states: The federal government offers special-
education grants to the states and, in accepting the funding, the states
agree to provide a "free [and] appropriate public education" (FAPE) as
specified by the Act to all children with an eligible disability.2 13 Nota-
bly for our purposes, in amendments to IDEA passed in 1990, Con-
gress explicitly added TBI as an eligible category of disability.214
Special education for individuals with brain injuries poses a num-
ber of unique challenges. The United States' special education system
has a variety of pathways for beginning interventions for infants and
toddlers with disabilities diagnosed early in life, whose parents often
become sophisticated advocates.21 5 By contrast, severe brain injury
occurs abruptly and often much later in a child's education, when in-
experienced and overwhelmed parents may struggle to locate the re-
sources necessary to transition their child from the hospital to an ap-
propriate educational environment.2" Even after that transition, in-
dividuals with acquired brain injuries can suffer from the assumption
that "as the child's outward manifestations of an injury fade, the in-
ternal damage is repaired as well."2 17 This may help to explain why
one group of scholars found that less than half of children who expe-
rience severe TBI and are still in special education four years later
are classified as suffering from TBI: most were classified under the
general learning disabilities designation in the IDEA, leading the
group to conclude that "because interventions for other handicapping
conditions have limited applicability in treating TBI, inappropriate
211. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2012).
212. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017) (quoting H.R. REP.
NO. 94-332, at 2 (1975)); see also Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub.
L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773.
213. Antonis Katsiyannis, Mitchell L. Yell & Renee Bradley, Reflections on the 25th
Anniversary of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 22 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL
EDUC. 324, 324 (2001).
214. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3).
215. Ronald C. Savage et al., Paediatric Traumatic Brain Injury: A Review of Pertinent
Issues, 8 PEDIATRIC REHAB. 92, 94 (2005).
216. Id. at 94, 95.
217. Rik Carl D'Amato & Barbara A. Rothlisberg, How Education Should Respond to
Students with Traumatic Brain Injury, 29 J. LEARNING DISABILITIES 670, 678 (1996).
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classifications are considered obstacles to effective programming."2 1 8
And, looking towards adult life, a systematic review of studies on the
transition of students with disabilities from school to post-school ac-
tivities found that students with acquired brain injuries are a partic-
ularly stigmatized and poorly treated group-and recommended "in-
clusive education" through more partnerships between general and
special educators to deliver an integrated educational experience.2 19
a. The Six Principles of the IDEA
For individuals who experience severe brain injury between birth
and age twenty-one, the IDEA provides an important but complex
tool for accessing appropriate education, transition services, and re-
lated resources. Six principles underpin the IDEA: (1) the provision
of a FAPE; (2) the appropriate use of experts and tools for the evalua-
tion of a student's capabilities; (3) a written document called an "in-
dividualized education program" (IEP); (4) parent and student partic-
ipation in decisionmaking; (5) education in the least restrictive envi-
ronment; and (6) procedural safeguards.2 20
i. Free and Appropriate
A primary aspect of a FAPE is that it is free to parents despite the
often substantially greater resources necessary to provide appropri-
ate education to students with disabilities. Parents may be reim-
bursed for the costs of private school education if a court determines
that the educational agency "had not made a free appropriate public
education available to the child in a timely manner prior to that en-
rollment," over which much IDEA litigation takes place.2 2 '
ii. Evaluation
Appropriate evaluation under the IDEA requires the use of
trained professionals and proper evaluation instruments.
iii. Individualized Education Program
The IEP is "a written statement for each child with a disability"
that includes a statement of the child's current academic and func-
tional performance; "measurable annual goals . . . designed to . . .
218. H. Gerry Taylor et al., Long-Term Educational Interventions After Traumatic
Brain Injury in Children, 48 REHAB. PSYCHOL. 227, 234 (2003).
219. R. Brian Cobb & Morgen Alwell, Transition Planning/Coordinating Interventions
for Youth with Disabilities: A Systematic Review, 32 CAREER DEV. EXCEPTIONAL INDIVIDU-
ALS 70, 73, 78 (2009).
220. DISABILITY RIGHTS EDUC. & DEF. FUND, A GUIDE FOR CALIFORNIA PARENTS: SPE-
CIAL EDUCATION DUE PROCESS AND THE RESOLUTION MEETING 2-3 (2008), https://dredf.org/
specialeducation/dueprocess.pdf [https://perma.cc/MRG3-A49M].
221. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2012).
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meet the child's needs"; how progress will be measured; the special
services and accommodations to be provided to the child; and post-
secondary goals and transition services for training, education, em-
ployment, or independent living.2 2 2
iv. Participation
The IDEA provides for substantial parental involvement in the
creation of the IEP through regular IEP meetings and affords a ro-
bust due process hearing for parents to challenge eligibility, services,
and the sufficiency of the education provided to their children.
v. Least Restrictive Environment
Finally, the IDEA requires that "[t]o the maximum extent appro-
priate, children with disabilities . . . are educated with children who
are not disabled," such that students are only removed from the nor-
mal educational environment "when the nature or severity of the disa-
bility of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily."223
vi. Procedural Safeguards
The IDEA has been characterized as "view[ing] special education
law through a strongly proceduralist lens . . . . [T]he process by
which the IEP is created is of far more importance than the substan-
tive content of the resulting IEP."2 24 Indeed, in the seminal Supreme
Court case on the IDEA, the Court pointed to the "contrast[]" be-
tween "the elaborate and highly specific procedural safeguards" and
"the general and somewhat imprecise substantive admonitions con-
tained in the Act," ultimately determining that the focus on process
"demonstrates the legislative conviction that adequate compliance
with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if
not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in
an IEP."2 2 5 On one level, this is troubling for failing to endorse any
strong substantive standard that schools must meet. Yet, on another
level, it provides an important model of robust procedural protections
that are largely lacking in other areas for individuals with severe
brain injury.
The procedural safeguards section of the IDEA requires states to
establish a detailed set of safeguards-including the opportunity for
parents to examine all records and participate in all meetings regard-
222. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i).
223. Id. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
224. Jon Romberg, The Means Justify the Ends: Structural Due Process in Special Edu-
cation Law, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 415, 416 (2011).
225. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205-06 (1982).
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ing the evaluation and placement of their child,2 6 a provision of no-
tice in the parents' native language,2 2 7 an opportunity for mediation
prior to a formal due process complaint and hearing,2 2 8 and the crea-
tion of a model form to assist parents in filing a due process com-
plaint.2 2 9 The IDEA provides grants for states to create parent train-
ing and information centers,230 and parents can meet with a disinter-
ested party from such a state center to discuss disputes.2 31 For par-
ents who decide on mediation, the state must bear the cost of media-
tion and must maintain a list of qualified mediators.232
At a due process hearing, the hearing officer must make a deter-
mination of whether the child received a FAPE, considering both
substantive factors and any procedural violations that impeded the
child's right to a FAPE. 23 3 After the hearing, parents have the oppor-
tunity to appeal to the state educational agency and, if still aggrieved
thereafter, may bring a civil action in U.S. district court.2 34 During
the due process hearing and appeal, parents are afforded a range of
important rights, including "the right to be accompanied and advised
by counsel and by individuals with special knowledge or training
with respect to the problems of children with disabilit[ies]"; 23 5 "the
right to present evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel
the attendance of witnesses";2 36 and the right to a written record of
the hearing and the hearing officer's decision.23 7
Although some have noted the disparities these time- and re-
source-intensive procedures may create based on socio-economic sta-
tus,2 3 8 these procedural safeguards provide a far greater opportunity
for institutional attention and support than individuals with severe
brain injury experience elsewhere in the medico-legal system.
226. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1).
227. Id. § 1415(d)(2).
228. Id. § 1415(e)-(f).
229. Id. § 1415(b)(8).
230. Id. §§ 1471-1472.
231. Id. § 1415(e)(2)(B).
232. Id. § 1415(e)(2)(C)-(D).
233. Id. § 1415(f)(3)(E).
234. Id. § 1415(i)(2).
235. Id. § 1415(h)(1).
236. Id. § 1415(h)(2).
237. Id. § 1415(h)(3)-(4).
238. See, e.g., Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private
Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413 (2011); Joseph Fluehr, Note, Navigating With-
out a Compass: Incorporating Better Parental Guidance Systems into the IDEA's Dispute
Resolution Process, 8 DREXEL L. REV. 155 (2015); Erin Phillips, Note, When Parents Aren't
Enough: External Advocacy in Special Education, 117 YALE L.J. 1802 (2008).
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b. The Scope of "Special Education and Related Services"
The IDEA provides for both "special education and related ser-
vices."239 "Related services," as provided for and defined in the IDEA,
contemplates a very wide range of resources, including:
[T]ransportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other
supportive services (including speech-language pathology and au-
diology services, interpreting services, psychological services, phys-
ical and occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic
recreation, social work services, school nurse services designed to
enable a child with a disability to receive a free appropriate public
education as described in the individualized education program of
the child, counseling services, including rehabilitation counseling,
orientation and mobility services, and medical services, except that
such medical services hall be for diagnostic and evaluation pur-
poses only) as may be required to assist a child with a disability to
benefit from special education . . . .240
As this definition suggests, "related services" can be interpreted
broadly enough to provide substantial resources to students with se-
vere brain injury. For instance, a court found that the parents of a
child with serious behavioral problems arising from a brain injury
should be reimbursed for private placement in a rehabilitation facili-
ty for brain injury victims because the school's provision of in-home
services failed to confer an educational benefit.24' The family succeed-
ed in this case even over the school board's objection that the facility
was a "'medical' program for which it was not responsible."24 2 In this
way, the IDEA serves as an appropriate counterpart to the ADA's
and the Rehabilitation Act's emphasis on rehabilitative services, not
just palliative care or, in the educational context, maintenance of the
status quo.24 3 Similarly, the least restrictive environment require-
ment mirrors the deinstitutionalization efforts of these statutes,
seeking to decrease the separation and isolation of individuals with
disabilities.2 4 4
239. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
240. Id. § 1401(26)(A).
241. Brown ex rel. Brown v. Wilson Cty. Sch. Bd., 747 F. Supp. 436, 445-46 (M.D. Tenn.
1990).
242. Id. at 439.
243. See supra notes 98-153 and accompanying text.
244. See, e.g., S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir.
2003).
2018] 347
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
c. What Level of Educational Benefit?
The Supreme Court recently considered an issue that is crucial in
clarifying the rights of children with disabilities, in general, and of
children with severe brain injury, in particular: What level of educa-
tional benefit must school districts provide in order to fulfill the
IDEA's requirement of providing a FAPE?2 45 In the first Supreme
Court case to consider the IDEA and the last one to meditate on the
definition of a FAPE, the Court held that though an IEP must be "rea-
sonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits,"
Congress did not intend to require "strict equality of opportunity or
services" or require schools to "maximize each handicapped child's
potential."2 46 In the wake of that 1982 decision, the courts of appeals
have developed different and conflicting standards on what degree of
benefit schools must confer: some hold that IEPs must confer "mean-
ingful educational benefit" on students, while others reject this higher
standard and hold that schools need only provide "merely . . . 'more
than de minimis' " benefit.247
In Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District,248 recently decid-
ed by the Supreme Court, the parents of a child with autism placed
him in private school after he made virtually no progress between
third and fifth grade at his public school; the school failed to respond
to Drew's increasing behavioral issues and his IEP for fifth grade
listed the vast majority of the same goals as his third grade IEP.2 49
Within months at the new school, which implemented an evidence-
based evaluation and program for children with autism, Drew
showed substantial progress.2 5 0 His improvement suggests that his
failure to progress over the preceding years at his original school is
attributable to the low expectations and insufficient methods set out
in his IEP rather than to incapacity-due to his disability-to benefit
from an appropriately tailored education.
The petitioner in Endrew F. argued that the IDEA required
"schools to provide children with disabilities with substantially equal
opportunities to achieve academic success, attain self-sufficiency, and
contribute to society,"2 5' and the U.S. government, arguing as amicus
curiae in support of the petitioner, urged that a program must be
245. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty.
Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017) (No. 15-827).
246. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 198, 199, 207 (1982) (emphasis added).
247. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 245, at 10, 12.
248. 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).
249. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 245, at 7.
250. Id.
251. Brief for Petitioner at 14, Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. 988 (No. 15-827).
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"aimed at significant educational progress in light of the child's cir-
cumstances. . . . [T]his is not a barely more than de minimis stand-
ard, and it's not a maximization standard."2 5 2 The Supreme Court
agreed, stating that the educational programs must be "appropriately
ambitious in light of [the child's] circumstances,"2 53 and the decision
may be very important for children with severe brain injuries whose
disabilities may drastically limit the capacity to benefit from special
education and services, but for whom long-term and incremental pro-
gress is still possible.
The U.S. district court's decision in Wenger v. Canastota Central
School District illustrates the difficulties that arise when the ability
to benefit educationally due to the severity of brain injury is in ques-
tion.2 54 In Wenger, after the plaintiffs son, Steven, experienced severe
brain injury in an automobile accident and a later seizure, independ-
ent medical evaluators testified that Steven "did not demonstrate
signs of obvious auditory processing, purposeful movement, or social
awareness, and that his responses appeared to be reflexive rather
than responsive."2 5 5 The school's IEP provided two hours per day of
special education, thirty minutes of speech therapy twice per week,
and physical therapy once per week-with the IEP goals of "re-
spond[ing] in a consistent manner to visual, auditory, and multisen-
sory stimuli, and . . . achiev[ing] a functional range of motion in his
upper and lower extremities."2 5 6 In affirming the sufficiency of this
IEP over the complaint of Steven's father, the court noted that Ste-
ven's "own physician and independent medical evaluators have stat-
ed that the severity of [his] condition prevents him from learning and
that he is incapable of benefiting from special education."2 5 ' However,
the court stressed that at the due process hearing, the "[p]laintiff
failed to provide any evidence indicating that Steven would benefit
from increased special education and related services."125 Because the
Supreme Court in Endrew F. affirmed a more substantial standard
for the level of benefit a school district must confer, the ability to pre-
sent evidence that certain assistive devices or other related services
would benefit the child would be particularly meaningful in cases like
Steven's.
252. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, 21, Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. 988 (No. 15-827)
(statement of Irv Gornstein, Counselor to the Solicitor General).
253. 137 S. Ct. at 1000.
254. 961 F. Supp. 416 (N.D.N.Y. 1997), affd in part and vacated in part on other
grounds, 146 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1998).
255. Id. at 421.
256. Id. at 418.
257. Id. at 421.
258. Id.
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3. Medicare and Access to Rehabilitation for Beneficiaries with
Severe Brain Injury
Here, we focus on determinations of coverage for inpatient reha-
bilitation for persons with severe brain injury insured through Medi-
care.2 5 9 Many patients with severe brain injury cannot fully achieve
their potential without access to rehabilitation. We have previously
documented how Medicare coverage policies matter in the context of
healthcare provision to persons with severe brain injury and subse-
quent disorders of consciousness.2 0 This Section will summarize re-
cent changes to the Medicare Policy Manual and analyze how Medi-
care regulations provide both obstacles to, and opportunities for, per-
sons with severe brain injury.
The Medicare Policy Manual was recently amended in response to
a court challenge. In Jimmo v. Sebelius, a group of plaintiffs with
chronic health conditions sued HHS in federal court, alleging that
Medicare local coverage determinations were being made on the basis
of a "rule-of-thumb improvement standard," rather than on the re-
quired criterion of "medical necessity."2 6 ' The plaintiffs alleged that
Medicare coverage was unlawfully denied if their condition was not
expected to improve and that they did not receive individual deter-
minations to which they were legally entitled.2 6 2 The case survived
summary judgment but ultimately was settled.26 3 The settlement re-
sulted in many changes to the Medicare Policy Manual, with empha-
sis on the requirement that coverage determinations be made based
on an individual's particular case, and that the standard used to as-
sess this case is "maintenance" rather than "improvement."2 6 4
259. Many persons with disabilities have Medicare. See Sandra M. Foote & Christo-
pher Hogan, Disability Profile and Health Care Costs of Medicare Beneficiaries Under Age
Sixty-Five, 20 HEALTH AFF. 242, 245 ex.2 (2001).
260. Joseph J. Fins et al., Whither the "Improvement Standard"? Coverage for Severe
Brain Injury After Jimmo v. Sebelius, 44 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 182, 182-83 (2016) [hereinaf-
ter Fins et al., Whither the "Improvement Standard"?]; Wright & Fins, supra note 62.
261. Amended Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Mandamus Relief at 2, 9,
Jimmo v. Sebelius, No. 5:11-cv-17, 2011 WL 5104355 (D. Vt. Oct. 25, 2011); see also Fins et
al., Whither the "Improvement Standard"?, supra note 260, at 185-86 (describing these
allegations).
262. Amended Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Mandamus Relief, supra
note 261, at 2; see also Fins et al., Whither the "Improvement Standard"?, supra note 260,
at 185-86. Cf 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2012) (requiring an individualized assessment of a child
with a disability).
263. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., JIMMO V. SEBELIUS SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT FACT SHEET, https://www.cms. gov/medicare/medicare-fee-for-service-payment/
SNFPPS/downloads/jimmo-factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/3T7D-RF9Q].




While this settlement can be considered a "win" for many persons
with chronic conditions, it is not necessarily helpful for persons with
disorders of consciousness, given that coverage determinations are
based on what physicians think is medically necessary. Given that
many physicians are not well-informed about disorders of conscious-
ness, patients with disorders of consciousness may not benefit from
these policy changes as it may be difficult to demonstrate that some
medical interventions and inpatient rehabilitation are medically nec-
essary. 265 However, these changes may help persons with severe
brain injury without subsequent disorders of consciousness receive
necessary medical care and rehabilitation, especially given that the
Medicare Policy Manual now specifies that inpatient rehabilitation
cannot be denied solely because a beneficiary is not expected to be-
come fully functionally independent.2 6
There are, however, recent allegations that Medicare has not fully
adhered to all of the terms of the settlement agreement, and in par-
ticular, the requirement hat it engage in an educational campaign to
ensure that those on the front-line making coverage decisions know
to apply a maintenance rather than improvement standard.2 7 Many
Medicare beneficiaries allege that they are still unlawfully subject to
the rule-of-thumb improvement standard.2 68 The judge responsible
for overseeing the settlement agreement granted a motion for en-
forcement of the settlement.26 9
We suggest that Medicare beneficiaries with severe brain injury
who are informed of a denial of coverage for an intervention related
to their injury appeal such denials to ensure that they are not being
subjected to a rule-of-thumb improvement standard, and instead re-
ceive an individualized determination. This appeal is appropriate
even if a medical necessity standard is being used because it may
provide an opportunity to present more evidence that they meet this
standard.
We further argue that to more fully aid all persons with severe
brain injury-including those with disorders of consciousness-and
265. Fins et al., Whither the "Improvement Standard"?, supra note 260 at 186-87.
266. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE BENEFIT POLICY MANUAL
§ 40.1.1 (2017), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/downloads/
bpl02c07.pdf [https://perma.cc/LEG2-AZSJ]; Fins et al., Whither the "Improvement Stand-
ard"?, supra note 260, at 186.
267. Judge Orders Medicare Agency to Comply with Settlement in "Improvement
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to prevent arbitrary denials of coverage at the local level given uncer-
tainty about what "medical necessity" means in the context of severe
brain injury, the Medicare coverage standard should expand "the def-
inition of 'reasonable and necessary' to include monitoring, rehabili-
tation, and therapy for MCS and view this heightened level of care as
a new standard of care."27  We also would include access to emerging
therapies such as drugs and devices in this definition of medical ne-
cessity in the context of severe brain injury.2 7'
4. Severe Brain Injury and Access to Safe and Effective Drugs
and Devices
In addition to access to rehabilitation, the restoration of health
and function of patients with severe brain injury-and especially dis-
orders of consciousness-will depend upon the development, and
ready availability, of novel drugs and devices.2 7 2 Drugs and devices
are regulated by the FDA, which requires evidence of safety and effi-
cacy prior to approval.27 3 The regulation of such drugs and devices is
currently in a period of flux, given the recent passage of the 21st
Century Cures Act (21st CCA). 2 7 4 It is thus an opportune time for ad-
vocates of those with severe brain injury to attempt to influence the
regulatory environment to protect and promote the interest of these
patients. In this Section, we will highlight two significant parts of the
21st CCA that are likely to affect the device approval process for per-
sons with severe brain injury who may benefit from devices such as
270. Fins et al., Whither the "Improvement Standard"?, supra note 260, at 189; see also
Wright & Fins, supra note 62, at 279.
271. Fins et al., Whither the "Improvement Standard"?, supra note 260, at 189.
272. There are many translational barriers to the development of medical devices, in-
cluding intellectual property laws and the need to obtain funding to conduct clinical trials
to bring the device to market and bridge what has been described as the a "valley of
death"-the gap between the basic research funding supplied by the National Institutes of
Health and funding from the marketplace. See generally Joseph J. Fins, Deep Brain Stimu-
lation, Free Markets and the Scientific Commons: Is it Time to Revisit the Bayh-Dole Act of
1980?, 13 NEUROMODULATION J. 153 (2009); Joseph J. Fins & Nicholas D. Schiff, Conflicts
of Interest in Deep Brain Stimulation Research and the Ethics of Transparency, 21 J. CLIN-
ICAL ETHICS 125, 125-26, 130 (2010); Joseph J. Fins et al., Ethical Guidance for the Man-
agement of Conflicts of Interest for Researchers, Engineers and Clinicians Engaged in the
Development of Therapeutic Deep Brain Stimulation, 8 J. NEURAL ENGINEERING 033001,
033003 (2011); Joseph J. Fins, Gary S. Dorfman & Joseph J. Pancrazio, Challenges to Deep
Brain Stimulation: A Pragmatic Response to Ethical, Fiscal, and Regulatory Concerns,
1265 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 80, 83, 86 (2012); Declan Butler, Crossing the Valley of
Death, 453 NATURE 840, 842 (2008).
273. 21 C.F.R. § 860.7(c) (2017).
274. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016).
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deep brain stimulation, which can aid in the restoration of conscious-
ness or communication-a capability for the realization of rights.2 5
Although the 21st CCA explicitly states that it makes no changes
to the premarket approval standards for medical devices, it directs
the FDA to use the "least burdensome appropriate means necessary
to demonstrate a reasonable assurance of device safety and effective-
ness."27 6 While this may increase the number of devices that make it
to consumers, devices that are subject to lower standards for approv-
al may not have their intended effect.27" Ensuring efficacy is particu-
larly important when devices pose serious risks to patients. For ex-
ample, deep brain stimulation is a promising treatment for restoring
functional abilities in persons with severe brain injury, but implanta-
tion of the device requires invasive neurosurgery. A rigorous assess-
ment of its risks and benefits is thus particularly important.
Another key component of the 21st CCA that is relevant for per-
sons with severe brain injury is an emphasis on patient-focused out-
comes. " The FDA has historically incorporated patient voices into
approval processes.2 9 We think it is important to include patient
voices, especially as it relates to conveying information about subjec-
tive effects of drugs or devices. But while patients with disorders of
consciousness might benefit from increased emphasis on patient ex-
perience and needs with respect to drug and device approval, by the
very definition of their condition, minimally conscious patients can-
not advocate for approval themselves or informally supplement the
results of clinical trials by coordinating anecdotal reports of suc-
cess.280 The burden would thus fall on their caregivers, but only ex-
ceptionally proactive and well-informed caregivers may be able to
275. See Wright & Fins, supra note 62, at 279-81 (discussing capabilities approach in
context of disorders of consciousness).
276. 21st Century Cures Act § 3058(b)(5)(A).
277. Joseph J. Fins et al., Misuse of the FDA's Humanitarian Device Exemption in Deep
Brain Stimulation for Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, 30 HEALTH AFF. 302, 302 (2011);
Megan S. Wright, Comment, A Case for Randomized, Double-Blinded, Sham-Controlled
Class III Medical Device Trials, 34 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 199, 201 (2015) (arguing for high-
er standards for efficacy in Class III medical device trials).
278. 21st Century Cures Act §§ 3001-04.
279. See generally Nina L. Hunter, Kathryn M. O'Callaghan & Robert M. Califf, Engag-
ing Patients Across the Spectrum of Medical Product Development: View from the US Food
and Drug Administration, 314 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2499 (2015) (summarizing the programs
in place at the FDA aimed at incorporating patient perspectives).
280. Cf Marie Thonnard et al., Effect of Zolpidem in Chronic Disorders of Conscious-
ness: A Prospective Open-Label Study, 28 FUNCTIONAL NEUROLOGY 259 (2013) (reporting
on a study that found no clinical improvements for patients with DOC on zolpidem); Jeffrey
L. Shames & Haim Ring, Transient Reversal of Anoxic Brain Injury-Related Minimally
Conscious State After Zolpidem Administration: A Case Report, 89 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL
MED. & REHAB. 386 (2008).
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take on this role. We would thus recommend that advocates for pa-
tients with severe brain injury encourage the FDA to adopt a formal
policy of requiring sponsors to supplement new drug and device ap-
plications with patient experience data at every opportunity.
This discussion assumes that researchers are able to recruit per-
sons with severe brain injury as participants in clinical trials of med-
ical devices such as deep brain stimulation. One challenge in this
context relates to informed consent to participate in research.2 8' Per-
sons with severe brain injury may be under guardianship due to the
severity of their injury. Guardianship removes decisionmaking au-
thority from a person and gives it to his or her guardian, and in the
context of consent to research, a guardian would be responsible for
providing the consent. The problem, however, is that a significant
minority of states restrict the ability of guardians to consent to par-
ticipation in research on behalf of their wards,2 8 2 which means that
persons who could benefit from access to clinical trials are denied
such access, and scientific progress is hindered.2 83 As we have argued
elsewhere, states should reform their guardianship laws to permit
guardians to decide on behalf of persons with severe brain injury who
may regain decisional capacity-after carefully weighing the risks
and benefits of participation-to participate in clinical trials that
would either contribute to general knowledge about their brain injury
or offer the prospect of direct benefit to the person with severe brain
injury, and in particular, obviate the need for continued guardianship.2 84
While there are many sources of federal law that could be used to
redress the problems facing persons with severe brain injury, the
most promising avenues for advocates to pursue are claims under the
ADA. If there were class-action lawsuits under the ADA, large num-
bers of people would benefit. A common problem, however, seems to
be lack of enforcement or oversight. Thus, advocates cannot take for
granted any legal victories but will have to work to ensure that any
legal rights afforded to persons with severe brain injury continue to
be protected.
281. 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2017).
282. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-12 (5-312)(4) (West 2017) ("Notwithstanding
general or limited authority to make medical decisions on behalf of the ward, no guardian
may consent to psychosurgery, abortion, sterilization, or experimental treatment of any
kind unless the procedure is first approved by order of the court.").
283. See Megan S. Wright, Michael R. Ulrich & Joseph J. Fins, Guardianship and Clin-
ical Research Participation: The Case of Wards with Disorders of Consciousness, 27 KEN-





IV. JUSTICE FOR PERSONS WITH SEVERE BRAIN INJURY
UNDER STATE LAW
Much of the legal action around disability discrimination and ac-
commodation occurs at the state level. Indeed, there is a long history
of states leading reform efforts to more fully include persons with
disability in civil society. For example, states had guide dog and
white cane laws prior to passage of section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973.215
The ADA preempts state disability discrimination laws when the
latter grants persons with disabilities fewer rights and protections.2 8 6
States can grant residents with disabilities greater protection and
more rights than the ADA, however. Because it is not feasible to ana-
lyze every states' laws, this Part will begin by focusing on California,
a state with disability discrimination law that offers greater protec-
tion than the ADA.
We will next consider selected additional sources of state law
(guardianship law and tort law) that offer promising tools to improve
the situation of persons with severe brain injury in society.
A. State Disability Discrimination Law
1. State Constitutions
States are free to grant broader protection to persons with disabil-
ities than the minimum protections required by federal law. The
state of California provides a promising example of progressive state
laws that may be leveraged to rectify legal injustices suffered by per-
sons with severe brain injury.
Given its marginalization, it is unsurprising that this especially
vulnerable population is not expressly mentioned in California law.
California courts, however, construe state legislation affecting the
rights of persons with disabilities broadly, explicitly acknowledging
that provisions in such legislation offer more expansive protection
than analogous provisions in federal legislation.2 8 7 Moreover, the pro-
tections afforded to persons with disabilities under California statu-
285. SCOTCH, supra note 64, at 28-29.
286. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (2017).
287. See, e.g., Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 55, 64 (Ct. App. 2000)
("[T]he Legislature has determined that the definitions of 'physical disability' and 'mental
disability' under the law of this state require a 'limitation' upon a major life activity, but do
not require, as does the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, a 'substantial limitation.'
This distinction is intended to result in broader coverage under the law of this state than
under that federal act." (alteration in original) (quoting CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926.1(c)
(2000)).
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tory law sound in the language of fundamental rights safeguarded by
the California constitution .28 8 Accordingly, even when an individual
plaintiffs disability is not explicitly included in statutory language
identifying the beneficiaries of protection, California courts construe
the text liberally to extend protections to such persons.2 8 9
Two provisions of the California constitution guarantee certain
fundamental rights to all persons. Article I, Section 1 provides: "All
people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable
rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, ac-
quiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and ob-
taining safety, happiness, and privacy."2 9 0 The right to personal liber-
ty, the California Supreme Court has stated, is "second only to life
itself."2 9 Article I, Section 7 concerns the deprivation of these funda-
mental rights. It provides: "A person may not be deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property without due process of law, or denied equal protec-
tion of the laws . . . ."292 The content of these rights follows their fed-
eral counterparts. California courts have explained that "[t]he equal
protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Cali-
fornia Constitution are substantially equivalent and analyzed in a
similar fashion."2 9 3
While these two constitutional provisions guarantee rights en-
joyed by all persons, the level of protection provided depends on the
type of harm alleged. California courts have held broadly that classi-
fications that violate fundamental rights, such as the right to person-
al liberty, are subject to strict judicial scrutiny.294 In People v. Leng,
the court applied strict scrutiny to find that the state's "use of a non-
serious, nonviolent juvenile adjudication to impose a second strike
sentence" on a juvenile defendant was a violation of the equal protec-
tion of the laws.2 9 5 California courts have also found, however, that
the "[e]qual protection clause does not require absolute or perfect
equality."2 9 6 The California constitution does not "direct that statutes
necessarily apply equally to all persons," and so it "permits the crea-
288. See, e.g., In re Hop, 623 P.2d 282, 286 (Cal. 1981).
289. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 498 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(describing how California courts construe disability statutes).
290. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
291. In re Hop, 623 P.2d at 286 (citing People v. Olivas, 551 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1976)).
292. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
293. People v. Leng, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 433, 439 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing In re Demergian,
768 P.2d 1069 (Cal. 1989)).
294. Id. at 440 (citing People v. Olivas, 551 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1976)).
295. Id. at 435.
296. Abel v. Cory, 139 Cal. Rptr. 555, 559 (Ct. App. 1977).
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tion of differences so long as those differences do not amount to an
invidious discrimination." 2 9 7
Whether rights are framed as deprivations of fundamental liber-
ties or as equal protection violations determines what level of scruti-
ny the court will apply. As described in greater detail below, we rec-
ommend that advocates for persons with severe brain injury style
their claims as deprivations of constitutionally guaranteed rights, but
not including equal protection violations.
2. State Statutes
California law provides fertile ground for seeking protection for
the constitutional rights of persons with severe brain injury. The Cal-
ifornia legislature has repeatedly reaffirmed the state policy that
persons with disabilities receive greater protection under California
law than under federal law. The California Government Code plainly
states that California's protection of persons with disabilities is at
least as broad as the ADA, providing that
[I]f the definition of "disability" used in the federal Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 would result in broader protection of the
civil rights of individuals with a mental disability or physical disa-
bility . . . or would include any medical condition not included
within those definitions, then that broader protection or coverage
shall be deemed incorporated by reference into [the Code] .291
Further, because California courts interpret the ADA broadly "to
address indifference to or benign neglect of the plight of the disa-
bled," they recognize that "outright intentional discrimination is not
required under [T]itle II of the ADA[]"-nor, consequently, California
disability law.2 9 9 Thus, "[u]nlawful discrimination occurs" under Cali-
fornia law "not just when the disabled are treated differently than
the nondisabled[,] [but also when] discriminatory treatment between
groups of disabled persons [occurs] ."3
Similarly, parts of the California Code require a disability to
merely "limit" a life activity, in contrast with the "substantial limita-
tion" required by the ADA.301 This deviation reflects a deliberate
choice by the California legislature to afford broader protection for
persons with disabilities in California than under federal law. 30 2 The
297. Id. at 559.
298. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926(n) (West 2017) (internal citations omitted).
299. Black v. Dep't of Mental Health, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39, 46 (Ct. App. 2000) (citation
omitted).
300. Id. at 46.
301. See, e.g., Diaz v. Fed. Express Corp., 373 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1049 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
302. Id. at 1049.
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Supreme Court itself has recognized California's policy; specifically,
as noted by Justice Brennan in Geduldig v. Aiello, California courts
"construe[] [disability statutes] liberally in aid of [their] declared
purpose to mitigate the evils and burdens which fall on the unem-
ployed and disabled worker and his family." 30 3
Against this expansive backdrop, the numerous provisions of the
California Code providing for the protection of persons with disabili-
ties may readily be construed to apply to persons with severe brain
injury. Section 1761 of the California Civil Code defines a "[d]isabled
person" to mean "a person who has a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities."3 0 4 That
section continues: " 'Major life activities' means functions that in-
clude caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."305 Though this
portion of the California Code retains the "substantial" limitation
language, severe brain injury easily qualifies as a disability under
these definitions.
It is unclear, however, whether severe brain injury would qualify
as a physical or mental disability under the California Code. Califor-
nia law, like the laws of many states, reflects a dichotomous classifi-
cation of physical and mental disabilities.306 This taxonomy is outdat-
ed; it does not reflect how modern healthcare practitioners under-
stand disability. The etiology of severe brain injury illustrates the
awkwardness of separating physical and mental disabilities. The Cal-
ifornia Code classifies physiological disfigurement of the brain (af-
fecting neurological functions) as a physiological disorder. A mental
impairment, however, is classified as a mental disorder. Severe brain
injury rests uncomfortably between these two definitions because it
entails significant mental impairments brought on, often, by physical
trauma. We encourage lawmakers to update the definitions for disa-
bilities appearing in legislation to better reflect the nondichotomous
etiologies and pathologies of disability.
As California law currently stands, however, the type of disability
under which severe brain injury is classified has important implica-
tions. It may be more beneficial for persons with severe brain injury
to be classified in California as mentally disabled because one partic-
ularly promising vehicle for providing broad protections to persons
with severe brain injury is section 4502 of the California Welfare and
303. 417 U.S. 484, 498 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
304. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1761(g) (West 2017).
305. Id. § 1761(g)(2).
306. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926 (West 2017); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1761(g).
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Institutions Code. That section protects the rights of persons with
developmental disabilities, a subclass of mental disabilities.30 7
Although persons with severe brain injury are unlikely to be clas-
sified as developmentally disabled,308 the rights the California Code
guarantees to persons with disabilities are merely applications of the
constitutional rights of all persons. Thus, although persons with se-
vere brain injury are not identified explicitly as recipients of the Cali-
fornia Code's protections, they clearly fall within the scope of protec-
tion afforded broadly to various classifications of persons with disa-
bilities. The California Welfare and Institutions Code, for example,
provides:
Persons with developmental disabilities have the same legal rights
and responsibilities guaranteed all other individuals by the United
States Constitution and laws and the Constitution and laws of the
State of California. An otherwise qualified person by reason of hav-
ing a developmental disability shall not be excluded from partici-
pation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any program or activity that receives public funds.309
This protection likely extends to persons with severe brain injury,
for as the California Supreme Court recognized in In re Hop, "[Sec-
tion 4502] is but a legislative reaffirmation of a firmly rooted and in-
dependent constitutional principle which assures that persons will
not be deprived of due process or equal protection of law on the basis
of developmental disability alone."3 1 0
Under the court's rationale, persons with severe brain injury may
have a strong claim to all the protections given to persons with devel-
opmental disabilities in section 4502 because those protections are
manifestations of guaranteed constitutional rights applied to a vul-
nerable population, and persons with severe brain injury need simi-
lar protections. Like persons with severe brain injury, persons with
developmental disabilities are often unable to make decisions for
themselves; a parent or a conservator make decisions. Conservators
307. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4502 (West 2017).
308. See id. § 4512(a) (defining "developmental disability" to mean "a disability that
originates before an individual attains 18 years of age; continues, or can be expected to
continue, indefinitely; and constitutes a substantial disability for that individual"). The
California Code does, however, include "disabling conditions found to be closely related to
intellectual disability or to require treatment similar to that required for individuals with
an intellectual disability," suggesting that persons suffering from severe brain injury be-
fore the age of 18 may have more success in qualifying directly for the protections of section
4512. Id.
309. Id. § 4502(a).
310. 623 P.2d 282, 286 (Cal. 1981) (emphasis added).
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are appointed to persons with developmental disabilities and persons
with severe brain injury for the same reasons.
In light of this overlap in vulnerabilities, the myriad rights enu-
merated in section 4502-geared toward safeguarding persons with
developmental disabilities from abuse and aiming to facilitate their
care-are equally applicable to persons with severe brain injury.
These rights are as follows:
1. The right to receive "treatment and habilitation services and
supports in the least restrictive environment."31' These "services
and supports" are quite broad.312 Further, they should "be directed
toward the achievement of the most independent, productive, and
normal lives possible."313 And they must "protect the personal lib-
erty of the individual and shall be provided with the least restric-
tive conditions necessary to achieve the purposes of the treatment,
services, or supports."3 14
2. Rights to "dignity, privacy, and humane care."3 1 5 Accordingly,
"[t]o the maximum extent possible, treatment, services, and sup-
ports shall be provided in natural community settings."316
3. A right "to prompt medical care and treatment."317
4. A "right to social interaction and participation in community ac-
tivities," 318 as well as "[a] right to physical exercise and recreation-
al opportunities."319
5. The right "to be free from harm" in the course of their treat-
ment.320 "Harm" is broadly defined, "including unnecessary physi-
cal restraint, or isolation, excessive medication, abuse, or ne-
glect."3 21 Similarly, patients with developmental disabilities have
"[a] right to be free from hazardous procedures."322
311. WELF. & INST. § 4502(b)(1) (emphasis added).
312. " 'Services and supports . . . means specialized services and supports or special
adaptations of generic services and supports directed toward the alleviation of a develop-
mental disability or toward the social, personal, physical, or economic habilitation or reha-
bilitation of an individual with a developmental disability, or toward the achievement and
maintenance of independent, productive, and normal lives." Id. § 4512 (emphases added).
313. Id. § 4502(b)(1).
314. Id.
315. Id. § 4502(b)(2).
316. Id. (emphases added).
317. Id. § 4502(b)(4).
318. Id. § 4502(b)(6).
319. Id. § 4502(b)(7).
320. Id. § 4502(b)(8).
321. Id.
322. Id. § 4502(b)(9).
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6. A right to make life choices, "including, but not limited to, where
and with whom they live, their relationships with people in their
community, the way they spend their time, including education,
employment, and leisure, the pursuit of their personal future, and
program planning and implementation."323
All these provisions of the California Welfare and Institutions
Code may be beneficial in ensuring that the rights of persons with
severe brain injuries are protected. In using statutes like the Califor-
nia Welfare Institutions Code, however, advocates should be mindful
of the need to carefully frame the rights of persons with severe brain
injury as constitutionally guaranteed rights and not statutorily ex-
tended social welfare benefits. The former will likely trigger stricter
scrutiny.
The famous Geduldig case illustrates the point. Geduldig v. Aiello
involved a challenge to a California disability insurance program that
exempted pregnancy-related work loss from coverage.3 2 4 The U.S. Su-
preme Court held that "consistently with the Equal Protection
Clause, a State 'may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the
phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative
mind.... The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply
a remedy there, neglecting the others.' "325 "Particularly with respect
to social welfare programs," the Court continued:
[S]o long as the line drawn by the State is rationally supportable,
the courts will not interpose their judgment as to the appropriate
stopping point. "[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not require
that a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a prob-
lem or not attacking the problem at all."326
Accordingly, the Court concluded, "We cannot agree that [Califor-
nia's] exclusion of [normal pregnancy] disability from coverage
amounts to invidious discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause."3 27
Geduldig was an equal protection case involving the exclusion of
the appellee from a California disability insurance program. The
question, therefore, was whether withholding benefits extended pur-
suant to the program was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
To avoid being subject to deferential rational basis review, advocates
for persons with severe brain injury should focus on due process ra-
ther than equal protection claims. In the mental disability context,
323. Id. § 4502(b)(10).
324. 417 U.S. 484, 484 (1974).
325. Id. at 495.
326. Id. (emphasis added).
327. Id. at 494.
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for example, a court held that under the Equal Protection Clause,
"statutory classifications that treat similarly situated mentally re-
tarded persons differently with respect to issues affecting their civil
commitments are evaluated using rational basis review."3 28 Instead,
the rights of persons with severe brain injury should be cast in terms
of absolute rights guaranteed by the state constitution, not rights
relative to other disabled groups.329
Plaintiffs in California have already successfully used non-equal-
protection strategies to rectify inadequate treatment conditions. In
2009, a large class of plaintiffs obtained a favorable settlement for
claims brought under the Lanterman Act-codified at section 4502 of
the California Welfare and Institutions Code-as well as other state
and federal laws.3 3 0 Plaintiffs' claims focused on the deprivation of
rights that the Lanterman Act guaranteed; they did not rely on equal
protection grounds. When a California appellate court granted class
certification to plaintiffs in 2007, it recited at length the class's com-
plaint describing the situation faced by persons with developmental
disabilities in California: "Thousands of Californians with develop-
mental disabilities are needlessly isolated and segregated from main-
stream society in large congregate public and private institutions.
Every year hundreds more find themselves at risk of institutionaliza-
tion due to the lack of appropriate community supports and crisis in-
tervention."3 3 1 Plaintiffs argued that these circumstances "violate[d]
[flederal and [s]tate law" because section 4502:
[C]reated an entitlement for people with developmental disabilities
to an array of services and supports sufficiently complete to meet
their needs and choices, to support their integration into the main-
stream life of the community and to enable them to approximate
the pattern of everyday living available to people without disabili-
ties. . . .332
Section 4502 is not discretionary, but a mandate-as is the ADA,
which sets a floor for protection under California law, and which the
U.S. Supreme Court construed in Olmstead3 3 3 to prohibit the "unjus-
328. People v. Rosalinda C., 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d 294, 303 (Ct. App. 2014).
329. Styling constitutional claims in terms of rights guaranteed, and not an equal
claim to benefits, avoids another rationale proffered by the state in Geduldig; namely, that
"[t]he State has a legitimate interest ... in distributing [] available resources in such a way
as to keep benefit payments at an adequate level for disabilities that are covered, rather
than to cover all disabilities inadequately." 417 U.S. at 496.
330. Proposed Settlement Agreement at 3-4, Capitol People First v. Dep't of Develop-
mental Servs., 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 300 (2008) (No. 2002-038715).
331. Capitol People First, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 308.
332. Id.
333. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
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tified institutional isolation of persons with disabilities" 334 Work on
behalf of persons with severe brain injuries may similarly draw on
mandatory constitutional guarantees to rectify constitutionally insuf-
ficient treatment.
B. Guardianship Law
Many persons with severe brain injury lose the capacity to make
some types of decisions, and in order to protect them from abuse and
to facilitate their care, they may have a guardian or conservator ap-
pointed to protect their person, property, or both.335 Unfortunately,
many guardianship laws unduly deprive persons under guardianship
of rights and liberties they may still be able to enjoy. This Section
will focus on how some states disqualify wards from voting upon ap-
pointment of a guardian.
For example, as discussed in the Introduction, David Rector suf-
fered a severe brain injury in 2009 and was appointed a conservator
to oversee his person and property; at the time of this appointment,
David was disqualified from voting.3 3 6 However, California updated
its probate code in 2016 to no longer presume incapacity to vote when
a person has a guardian; instead, if people can express a desire to
vote, they retain their voting rights.33 7 Given this change and David's
recovery to the point where he could communicate with an electronic
voice and eye-tracking software, he and his conservator requested the
reinstatement of David's voting rights.338 The probate judge responsi-
ble for David's case initially refused to reinstate his voting rights ab-
sent more evidence that David had the capacity to vote and that his
conservator would not be influencing his vote.3 39 David and his con-
servator returned to court, and, given the change in California law,
the judge reinstated David's voting rights.34 0
While David was able to regain his voting rights, tens of thou-
sands of other Californians under guardianship may not be as civical-
334. Id. at 600.
335. Joseph J. Fins & Barbara Pohl, Guardianship and the Injured Brain: Representa-
tion and the Rights of Patients and Families, in FINDING CONSCIOUSNESS: THE NEUROSCI-
ENCE, ETHICS, AND LAW OF SEVERE BRAIN DAMAGE 246, 246 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed.,
2016).
336. Elliot Spagat, Disabled California Man Seeks to Have Voting Rights Restored, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 23, 2016, 7:28 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/
articles/20 16-08-23/restored-voting-rights-sought-for-california-disabled-people.
337. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1910 (West 2017).
338. Spagat, supra note 336.
339. Order Requesting More Information, Conservatorship of David E. Rector, No. 37-
2009-00152179 (Cal. Prob. Ct. Sept. 21, 2016).
340. Order Reinstating Voting Rights, Conservatorship of David E. Rector, No. 37-
2009-00152179 (Cal. Prob. Ct. Sept. 21, 2016).
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ly minded and knowledgeable about the state of the law, or have the
means to fight for their voting rights in court. Furthermore, many
other states have not been as progressive as California in updating
their guardianship laws to acknowledge the fact that some persons
with disabilities, while having a need for guardianship, also retain
the capacity to vote. 341 It is problematic that persons not under
guardianship are not asked to demonstrate any capacity to vote while
those under guardianship are presumed to lack such capacity. This
reality may violate the Voting Rights Act and Title II of the ADA. 342
We offer several suggestions for reforming guardianship law to
better address the needs of persons with severe brain injury who
have guardians or conservators.34 3 First, given that guardianship is a
significant liberty infringement, in order for a guardianship ap-
pointment to be in the best interests of a person with severe brain
injury, the guardian should only have the powers that the person
with severe brain injury is not able to exercise. For example, if per-
sons with severe brain injury can still determine whom they want
their healthcare provider to be and where they want to live, they
should retain this decisionmaking authority even if they may need a
conservator of their property.344 Along with this suggestion, the need
for guardianship should be regularly evaluated by a judge and inves-
tigated by a guardian ad litem, and if the need for the guardianship
no longer exists, it should be promptly terminated.34 5
We suggest that states adopt laws like California's new probate
code amendment, which preserves as a default voting rights for per-
sons with guardians.3 46 While some argue that a person who does not
have the capacity to vote could (through a presumption that con-
servatees retain voting rights) have his or her vote manipulated by
341. See BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW ET AL., A GUIDE TO THE VOTING
RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 12-13 (2016), http://www.bazelon.org/wp-
content/uploads/20 17/0 1/voting-rights-guide-20 16.pdf [https://perma.cc/TL7A-Z2VB].
342. See, e.g., Complaint at 6, Disability and Abuse Project of Spectrum Inst. v. L.A.
Superior Court (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights Div., July 10, 2014),
http://disabilityandabuse.org/doj/complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/952F-FYK3] (alleging that
probate judges use literacy tests in violation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and do not
offer reasonable accommodations to assist persons with disabilities in voting in violation of
Title II of the ADA).
343. The scope of our Article excludes a consideration of disability more broadly, but
these suggestions to reform guardianship may also aid people with other types of disabilities.
344. The purpose of the guardianship appointment should be to enable the person with
severe brain injury to be integrated in civil society to the greatest extent possible. Judges
should instruct guardians to make housing decisions with the least restrictive residence in
mind. Ideally, it would become standard practice for professional guardians to identify the
least restrictive housing options for their wards.
345. See Wright, Ulrich & Fins, supra note 283, at 62-63.
346. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1910 (West 2017).
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conservators,34 7 we assert that the procedural safeguards in Califor-
nia's law348 are sufficient to prevent this from occurring on a scale
large enough to warrant the opposite presumption from being the
law.
We also argue that for those currently under guardianship in Cali-
fornia who have the capacity to express a desire to vote, obstacles to
the reinstatement of voting rights should be removed. Professional
guardians in California should be informed of the change in law and
ask their wards if they have a desire to vote, and if they do, the
guardians should advocate for reinstatement of voting rights. We also
need a public media campaign to inform lay guardians of family
members of the change in the law. Probate judges should receive
training about the nature of brain injuries and how assistive devices
aid in seemingly unconventional communication so that they do not
unjustly deny requests for voting rights reinstatement. If lobbying
state legislatures to reform guardianship law with respect to voting
is unsuccessful, it may be necessary to challenge the constitutionality
of the statutes in court or to sue under the ADA.349
C. Tort Law
In this Section, we examine common law tort means of redress for
harms to people with severe mental disabilities. We focus on legal
rights of people with severe disorders of consciousness in a
healthcare setting. In particular, we discuss the limits and potential
of claims based on negligence actions of misdiagnosis and failure to
obtain informed consent.
1. Tort Law and Mental Disability: A Brief Review
Much of the previous scholarship on tort law and mental disability
has been concerned with the applicability of the reasonable person
standard for liability to persons with mental disabilities. Under the
reasonable person standard, the actions of defendants in negligence
cases are evaluated against an objective standard: How would a rea-
sonable person have acted under the circumstances? Courts generally
apply the reasonable person standard even where the defendant has
347. See, e.g., Conservatorship of David E. Rector, No. 37-2009-00152179 (Cal. Prob.
Ct. Sept. 21, 2016).
348. They must be able to communicate a desire to vote to the satisfaction of a judge.
PROB. § 1910.
349. See, e.g., Letter from Elizabeth Johnson, Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Thomas F. Coleman, Legal Dir., Disability & Abuse Project, (1Vlay 15, 2015),
http://www.spectruminstitute.org/votingrights/doj-letter-to-spectrum.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WS82-24HS] (responding to a request to investigate possible ADA Title II violations because
California deprives persons under conservatorship of the right to vote).
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a mental disability. Many commentators have criticized this practice
as unreasonable and unfair.3 50 Others, however, have argued that the
universal legal standard is favorable to disability rights; insofar as a
universal standard implies that persons with mental disabilities are
competent and capable of acting responsibly, it might help to destig-
matize mental disability.3 5 1
Scholars have also criticized tort law's approach to disability on
other grounds. For example, Sarah Light has argued that tort law
offers incentives for confining persons with mental disabilities; 352
Anne Bloom and Christy Hetherington Roger have separately exam-
ined how tort litigation perpetuates the idea that persons with disa-
bilities are "less than whole," to the detriment of persons with disa-
bilities broadly; 353 and Wendy Hensel has pointed out that tort law's
characterization of a disabled life as itself an injury or "wrongful,"
has detrimental psychological effects on persons with disabilities,
and perpetuates negative societal perceptions of disability.3 5 4
Other scholars have looked to the common law of torts for possible
causes of action to protect the interests of persons with disabilities.
Mark Weber, focusing on disability discrimination outside the
healthcare context, has found promise in a number of possible torts-
including negligence, assault and battery, and especially the related
torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress and dignitary
harm or injury to "personality interests."3 5 5 Steven Schwartz has ex-
350. See, e.g., Johnny Chriscoe & Lisa Lukasik, Re-Examining Reasonableness: Negli-
gence Liability in Adult Defendants with Cognitive Disabilities, 6 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1
(2015); Harry J.F. Korrell, The Liability of Mentally Disabled Tort Defendants, 19 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 1 (1995); Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Mental Disabilities and Duty in Negli-
gence Law: Will Neuroscience Reform Tort Doctrine?, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 591 (2015);
Grant H. Morris, Requiring Sound Judgments of Unsound Minds: Tort Liability and the
Limits of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 47 SMU L. REV. 1837 (1994); Ian J. Cosgrove, Note,
The Illusive "Reasonable Person": Can Neuroscience Help the Mentally Disabled?, 91 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 421 (2015); Jacob E. McKnite, Note, When Reasonable Care Is Unreasonable:
Rethinking the Negligence Liability of Adults with Mental Retardation, 38 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 1375 (2012).
351. Okianer Christian Dark, Tort Liability and the "Unquiet Mind": A Proposal to
Incorporate Mental Disabilities into the Standard of Care, 29 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 311, 314
(2004); Stephanie I. Splane, Note, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill in Negligence Actions,
93 YALE L.J. 153, 154, 165-66 (1983).
352. Sarah Light, Note, Rejecting the Logic of Confinement: Care Relationships and the
Mentally Disabled Under Tort Law, 109 YALE L.J. 381, 381-82 (1999).
353. Anne Bloom & Paul Steven Miller, Blindsight: How We See Disabilities in Tort
Litigation, 86 WASH. L. REV. 709, 727 (2011); Christy Hetherington, Note, Rhode Island
Facing the Wrongful Birth/Life Debate: Pro-Disabled Sentiment Given Life, 6 ROGER WIL-
LIAMS U. L. REV. 565, 577-78 (2001).
354. Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Ac-
tions, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 144 (2005).
355. Mark C. Weber, The Common Law of Disability Discrimination, 2012 UTAH L.
REV. 429, 437 n.44, 456-66. Weber explains:
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amined damage actions broadly as modes to recompense harm to per-
sons with mental disabilities, arguing that such actions offer promis-
ing means of improving the care, as well as societal perceptions of,
persons with mental disabilities.35 6
Our aims here are both to fill gaps in what is already a rich litera-
ture on tort law and mental disability, and to develop means of re-
dress for harms to persons with severe mental disabilities, where
there are not clear and easy precedents in the case law to follow, nor
secondary sources to consult for guidance. Accordingly, we focus on
an area that is relatively unexamined in the legal literature, but that
we believe demands urgent attention: negligence toward persons
with severe disorders of consciousness.
2. Misdiagnosis
As we discussed in detail in Part II, patients with disorders of
consciousness are misdiagnosed as vegetative at a stunningly high
rate. As a result of such misdiagnoses, patients with conscious
awareness are treated as though they are totally unconscious, and
decisions concerning their care are made on that assumption.
Misdiagnoses of VS have dire consequences: people with conscious
awareness are subjected to painful and undignified treatment; more-
over, their care is based on the false belief that they have no chance
of improvement or recovery.3 57
We argue that many patients who receive misdiagnoses of VS, or
premature diagnoses as permanently vegetative, should be entitled
to legal relief. Legal claims based on negligence will not only help re-
The intentional infliction cause of action is well suited to instances when some-
one inflicts severe emotional distress on a person with a disability by exposing
that person to continual ridicule, cruel pranks, threats and intimidation, or
other abusive treatment. According to the Second Restatement . . . "[t]he ex-
treme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from the actor's
knowledge that the other is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress, by rea-
son of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity." Power disparities also
support a finding that behavior is outrageous when the behavior inflicts severe
emotional harm on a person with a disability.
Id. at 461-62; see also Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in
the Law of Torts, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 841 (1966) (examining the potential of tort law to im-
prove the lives of people with disabilities, focusing on tort claims involving the right to
service animals, common carrier liability, and white cane laws).
356. Steven J. Schwartz, Damage Actions As a Strategy for Enhancing the Quality of
Care of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 651, 655-56,
684 (1989).
357. Giacino et al., Disorders of Consciousness, supra note 16, at 103; see also
Schnakers et al., supra note 44, at 1 ("Misdiagnosis [of VS] can lead to grave consequences,
especially in end-of-life decision-making."); Andrews et al., supra note 45, at 13 ("The diag-
nosis of the vegetative state can have a major influence on decision making about the level
of care or services provided and may lead to . . . withdrawal of tube feeding.").
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dress the wrongs committed against these patients but should also
incentivize positive change in health care practices. 358
a. Standard of Care
For a successful claim of negligence, the plaintiff must prove that
the defendant owed her a duty of care, that the defendant failed to
meet the applicable standard of care, and that the plaintiff was in-
jured as a result.3 5 9 If a medical malpractice claim based on negli-
gence is successful, both the patient injured as a result of the negli-
gent conduct and the patient's family members may be entitled to
recover.360 Relief includes compensatory damages for physical injury
and pain, economic losses, and noneconomic losses.36 ' However, in
general, the applicable standard of care in negligence cases involving
physicians is taken to be the ordinary standard of care.362 Although
the definition of this standard differs across jurisdictions,363 the test
generally amounts to an inquiry as to what a reasonable practitioner
would have done under the circumstances.364 Additionally, courts rely
on expert testimony unless the answer to the inquiry is common
358. While we focus on individual claims here, class actions are a possibility for a group
of patients who have received similar negligent treatment from the same medical profes-
sional; however, class actions are unlikely to be successful in the medical malpractice con-
text, given the requirements of class certification-in particular, the requirements of nu-
merosity and predominance of common questions over individual issues. See, e.g., Georgine
v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 627 (3d Cir. 1996), aff'd, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Carroll
v. Cellco P'ship, 713 A.2d 509, 515 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998); Komonczi v. Fields, 648
N.Y.S.2d 151 (App. Div. 1996); Kanon v. Brookdale Hosp. Med. Ctr., 386 N.Y.S.2d 274
(Sup. Ct. 1975). For a discussion of the topic, see Robert R. Levinson, The Pitfalls of Com-
monality, Predominance and Class Action Mass Tort Cases, 2002 N.J. LAW. 31, 32.
359. See Cecily M. Fuhr, Cause of Action for Medical Malpractice Based on Misdiagno-
sis of or Failure to Diagnose Cancer, in 45 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 205 § 3 (2017); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 281, 328A (AM. LAW. INST. 1965); 61 AM. JUR. 2D
Physicians, Surgeons, Etc. §183 (2017).
360. See 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 342 (2017) ("A
spouse may recover any damage that he or she has suffered in the form of loss of services
which has resulted from malpractice that has injured the other spouse . . . [t]he loss of
consortium is a widely recognized cause that may be brought by the spouse and sometimes
by the children or parents of a loved one."); see also Dahan v. UHS of Bethesda, Inc., 692
N.E.2d 1303, 1305, 1306 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); Shaweker v. Spinell, 181 N.E. 896 (Ohio
1932); AM. JUR. 2D Torts § 55 (2017).
361. See Fuhr, supra note 359, § 27.
362. See, e.g., Cummings v. Jha, 915 N.E.2d 908, 920 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) ("[A] physician
or surgeon is bound to possess and use reasonable skill, not perhaps the highest degree of
skill that one learned in the profession may acquire, but reasonable skill such as physi-
cians in good practice ordinarily use and would bring to a similar case."); Pugh v. Swiontek,
253 N.E.2d 3, 5 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) ("Where, as in the instant case, there is admittedly a
misdiagnosis, the question remains as to whether such misdiagnosis was the exercise of a
reasonable medical judgment or a judgment arrived at without the exercise of appropriate
care.").
363. See 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 200 (2017).
364. See id. § 186.
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knowledge.365 The reasonable practitioner standard presents a major
challenge to negligence actions against physicians who have misdi-
agnosed patients as vegetative. Given the diagnostic difficulties con-
cerning disorders of consciousness and the high rate of misdiagnosis,
medical experts are unlikely to testify that a reasonable practitioner
would have acted differently; accordingly, courts are unlikely to find
that a misdiagnosis of VS constitutes negligence.
However, the malpractice case law shows some willingness of
courts to relax the reasonable practitioner standard and to establish
new standards of care where the professional norm is insufficient or
unclear.366 As Schwartz points out, courts have been more receptive
to this move when (1) there is "a related or analogous standard of
care to which the court can refer," or (2) "professionals themselves
have articulated definitions of appropriate care."3 67
The medical profession has existing standards by which certain
medical determinations be made only by practitioners with special-
ized knowledge, and only by following specific, systematic procedures.
For example, the American Academy of Neurology issued Practice
Parameters for brain death determinations in 1995 (AANPP), and
updated those parameters in 2010.368 These parameters specify nec-
essary qualifications for medical professionals who make brain-death
determinations, as well as detailed procedures for the brain-death
examination.369 While there is variability among institutions across
the country, with many falling short of the AANPP, institutional pol-
icies do track the parameters.3 70 We propose that the same kind of
requirements-in particular, specialized knowledge and an official,
systematic procedure-should apply to medical determinations and
recommendations involving severe disorders of consciousness. A new
medical and legal standard can be developed based on the model of
the national standard for brain-death determination.
Moreover, many medical professionals and researchers have ex-
pressed concern with the problem of misdiagnosis of disorders of con-
sciousness and have in fact proposed new standards of care which, if
followed, would reduce rates of misdiagnosis, as well as mitigate the
365. See, e.g., Weaver v. McKnight, 97 A.3d 920 (Conn. 2014).
366. Schwartz, supra note 356, at 673 (citing Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cali-
fornia, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), as an example of a court establishing a new standard of
care independent of professional norms); Gerald L. Klerman, The Psychiatric Patient's
Right to Effective Treatment: Implications of Osheroff v. Chestnut Lodge, 147 AM. J. PSY-
CHIATRY 409, 415 (1990).
367. Schwartz, supra note 356, at 678, 681.
368. Hilary H. Wang et al., Improving Uniformity in Brain Death Determination Poli-
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adverse consequences of misdiagnosis given that some degree of di-
agnostic error is inevitable. While differentiating VS from MCS pre-
sents major challenges,371 the medical literature suggests that im-
proved diagnostic accuracy is attainable even given the currently
available diagnostic methods. For example, Schnakers has suggested
that, "the systematic use of a sensitive standardized neurobehavioral
assessment scale may help decrease diagnostic error and limit diag-
nostic uncertainty";372 Giacino has published a highly cited set of de-
tailed recommendations, "intended to serve as a reference for clini-
cians involved in the examination and treatment of patients with se-
vere alterations in consciousness"; 373 and multiple commentators
have called for an end to the "therapeutic nihilism" of the medical
profession regarding patients with severe disorders of conscious-
ness.3 7 4 Plaintiffs bringing negligence causes of action based on mis-
diagnosis could benefit from appealing to the work that clinicians
and researchers have done to articulate improved standards of care;
this work might influence what courts take to be the appropriate
standard.
b. Grounds for Relief
Assuming plaintiffs can overcome the standard of care test, they
could recover (1) for pain and suffering that resulted from their mis-
diagnoses, and (2) for the loss of chance of a better outcome. Although
we focus on damages here, another option for legal relief for one who
has been prematurely diagnosed as permanently vegetative, or diag-
nosed based on insufficient evidence, is an injunction; if successful in
such an action, medical professionals would be enjoined from treating
the patient as if she were in VS unless and until the diagnosis could
be made with more certainty. However, the success of injunction
claims in this context might be detrimental to damage claims, since
some courts have held that where ex ante injunctive relief is availa-
ble, it is not necessary to grant ex post damage relief.375
371. Giacino et al., Disorders of Consciousness, upra note 16; Schnakers et al., supra
note 44, at 1.
372. Schnakers et al., supra note 44, at 2, 4; see also Giacino et al., Disorders of Con-
sciousness, upra note 16; FINS, BRAIN INJURY, supra note 1, at 177, 301.
373. Giacino et al., Minimally Conscious State, supra note 4, at 352.
374. Joseph T. Giacino, The Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States: Consensus-
Based Criteria for Establishing Diagnosis and Prognosis, 19 NEUROREHAB. 293, 297 ("
'[T]herapeutic nihilism' . . . represents the belief that patients with prolonged disorders of
consciousness are beyond help, therefore, any effort to intervene is futile and unjustified.");
see also FINS, BRAIN INJURY, supra note 1; Giacino et al., Disorders of Consciousness, upra
note 16, at 2.
375. See Estate of Taylor v. Muncie Med. Inv'rs L.P., 727 N.E.2d 466 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
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Patients diagnosed as in VS are not given analgesic treatment in
situations where conscious patients would be, and moreover, are
treated more roughly than conscious patients.3 76 Furthermore, pa-
tients in VS are often not afforded the human interaction or treated
with the basic consideration that is expected of medical professionals
with respect to conscious patients; many misdiagnosed patients suf-
fer extensively as a result.3 7 7 Consequently, patients inaccurately di-
agnosed as in VS will likely have strong damage claims for compen-
sation for the pain and suffering they experienced as a result of their
misdiagnoses.
A misdiagnosis of VS, or premature diagnosis of permanent VS,
often means a loss of chance for a better outcome-either because the
patient does not receive the treatment and rehabilitation that an
MCS patient would receive, or because life support is withdrawn in
response to a permanent VS diagnosis. As many clinicians and re-
searchers have noted, the diagnosis of a severe disorder of conscious-
ness "is strongly associated with functional outcome."3 7 8 Jurisdictions
differ on their approaches to loss of chance. Many jurisdictions have
adopted the proportional approach: the relevant inquiry is "whether
the defendant probably caused a reduction in the victim's chances"; if
causation is found, the court grants "compensation for the lost chance
in direct proportion to the extent of the lost chance."3 79 Lost chance of
376. See, e.g., FINS, BRAIN INJURY, supra note 1.
377. See, e.g., id. (providing several examples of patients in MCS who experienced severe
pain and suffering because they were treated as though they were completely unconscious).
378. Giacino et al., Disorders of Consciousness, upra note 16, at 1.
379. 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 340 (2017); see, e.g.,
Ford-Sholebo v. United States, 980 F. Supp. 2d 917 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Foskey v. United
States, 490 F. Supp. 1047, 1057-58 (D.R.I. 1980) (holding defendant physician liable under
loss of chance theory for increased risk of a grand mal seizure in infant patient, which did
in fact occur); Peterson v. Ocean Radiology Assocs., P.C., 951 A.2d 606 (Conn. App. Ct.
2008); Holton v. Mem'l Hosp., 679 N.E.2d 1202 (Ill. 1997) (holding that a plaintiff can prove
causation under loss of chance theory by showing with reasonable medical certainty that
plaintiffs risk of harm was increased, or effectiveness of treatment decreased, as a result of
defendant's negligence); N. Tr. Co. v. Louis A. Weiss Mem'l Hosp., 493 N.E.2d 6 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1986) (finding defendant hospital liable for patient's injury because its negligent delay
in treatment was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury); Smith v. Washington,
734 N.E.2d 548 (Ind. 2000); Wolfe v. Estate of Custer ex rel. Custer, 867 N.E.2d 589 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2007) (holding for plaintiff in negligence action against physician, where plaintiff
provided evidence quantifying the increased risk resulting from physician's conduct); Rob-
erts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio 1996). But see Netto v.
Goldenberg, 640 N.E.2d 948, 953-54 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (stating that defendant physician is
not liable if plaintiff shows only that physician's negligence was a substantial factor con-
tributing to plaintiffs harm). Loss of chance is handled differently depending on the jurisdic-
tion, and some states have adopted loss of chance doctrines that make it particularly chal-
lenging for plaintiffs to recover. Under Mississippi law, for example, a plaintiff must prove
that if given a proper diagnosis or treatment, she would have had a greater than fifty percent
chance of a significantly better outcome. See Chickaway v. United States, 990 F. Supp. 2d 650
(S.D. Miss. 2013); Mem'l Hosp. at Gulfport v. White, 170 So. 3d 506 (Miss. 2015).
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survival is a more specific doctrine that has been adopted in some
states, allowing plaintiffs to recover where the chance of a patient's
survival was substantially reduced as a result of defendant's negli-
gent conduct.380 Where patients are inaccurately or prematurely di-
agnosed as permanently vegetative, their chances of recovery might
be drastically reduced; moreover, any chance of survival might be
eliminated as a result of a premature diagnosis or a misdiagnosis.
The loss of chance doctrine is meant to redress precisely this type of
harm.
While we have focused on misdiagnosis here, it is also the case
that patients can progress from VS to MCS (and emerge from MCS) if
given appropriate treatment. Studies have demonstrated that pa-
tients often receive improved diagnoses after receiving therapeutic
interventions.381 Consequently, a loss of chance claim need not be
based on misdiagnosis; instead, it could be based on an argument to
the effect that the patient's chance of progressing beyond VS was re-
duced or eliminated as a result of inadequate care.
A possible adverse consequence of a patient receiving an MCS di-
agnosis is that it might make it difficult or impossible for a surrogate
decisionmaker to have life support withdrawn from that patient,
even if there is compelling evidence to suggest that the individual
would not want to live under the circumstances.3 82 The current legal
standard requires "clear and convincing evidence" of the individual's
wishes in order for a request for withdrawal of life support to be
granted. While people do often express preferences regarding wheth-
er they would want to continue living should they end up in a VS,
people are not, in general, knowledgeable about the MCS and the re-
lationship between VS and MCS. Consequently, it would be highly
380. See, e.g., Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 480 (allowing recovery where defendant's conduct
reduced chance of survival from twenty-eight percent o zero percent); McKellips v. Saint
Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 472-74 (Okla. 1987). But see Joshi v. Providence Health
Sys. of Or. Corp., 149 P.3d 1164, 1169-70 (Or. 2006) (declining to adopt the lost chance of
survival doctrine).
381. FINS, BRAIN INJURY, supra 1, at 177.
382. Marybeth Herald argues that the Wendland decision, Conservatorship of
Wendland, 28 P.3d 151 (Cal. 1991), "places a nearly insurmountable burden of proof on the
conservator of a person in a minimally conscious state," and goes on to argue that the right
to withdraw life support is more important for people in MCS than VS: "[t]he burdens of
continued life are far greater for the minimally conscious patient than those in the persis-
tent vegetative state," given that people in MCS, unlike VS, are sentient and aware.
Marybeth Herald, Until Life Support Do Us Part: A Spouse's Limited Ability to Terminate
Life Support for an Incompetent Spouse with No Hope of Recovery, 24 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
207, 212, 215 (2002); see also Courtenay R. Bruce, Comment, The Awful Stranger, Con-
sciousness: A Proposed Analytical Framework for Minimally Conscious State Cases, 1
PHOENIX L. REV. 185, 200 (2008) ("MCS patients are categorically denied the right to with-
draw treatment, and evidence suggesting a preference to withdraw treatment will be
deemed incredible or insufficient . . . ."); Mary Ann Buckley, Comment, In Re Wendland:
Contradiction, Confusion, and Constitutionality, 11 J.L. & POL'Y 255 (2002).
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unusual for someone to indicate preferences specifically for how they
wish to be treated in the event that they become minimally conscious.
c. Informed Consent
Surrogate decisionmakers, most often next of kin, have the task of
consenting to treatment, or termination of treatment, for patients
with severe disorders of consciousness who do not have the capacity
to consent themselves.383 However, often these decisionmakers are
not adequately informed to make such decisions. We argue that vio-
lations of the legal right to informed consent occur when surrogate
decisionmakers are not informed of the difficulty with diagnosing
disorders of consciousness and, in particular, the misdiagnosis rates
of VS, as well as the chance that the patient, if currently in VS,
would regain some degree of consciousness under certain courses of
treatment. As one of us has noted elsewhere, often "surrogate decision
makers take [loss of consciousness] as an important prognostic sign
and use this loss as a prompt to make end-of-life decisions," perhaps
not aware of the likelihood of MCS and associated chance of recovery.384
Patients have a right to informed consent both for undergoing
treatment and for refusing treatment.385 While the doctrine of in-
formed consent was traditionally grounded in battery, most informed
consent cases today are based on a negligence theory.386 The elements
of a tort claim for failure to obtain informed consent are as follows:
(1) "that the physician owed a duty to disclose the risk," (2) "that the
physician breached the duty," (3) "that the patient suffered an inju-
ry," and (4) "that the physician's breach of the duty to disclose was
383. "Unless the patient has a legal guardian appointed, or has designated a surrogate
... consent is obtained from the next-of-kin." SUSAN 0. SCHEUTZOW, AHLA, PATIENT CARE
11 (1999); see also Kellen F. Rodriguez, Suing Health Care Providers for Saving Lives: Lia-
bility for Providing Unwanted Life-Sustaining Treatment, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 23 (1999)
("In the majority of states, an appointed surrogate or relative can refuse treatment for an
incompetent on the basis of prior statements, life views, personality, or basic values, that
is, a 'substituted judgment' standard.").
384. FINS, BRAIN INJURY, supra note 1, at 184.
385. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 271 (1990) ("[M]ost courts
have based a right to refuse treatment either solely on the common-law right to informed
consent or on both the common-law right and a constitutional privacy right."); Andrew J.
Broder & Ronald E. Cranford, "Mary, Mary, Quite Contrary, How Was Ito Know?" Michael
Martin, Absolute Prescience, and the Right to Die in Michigan, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
787, 796 (1995) ("[T]he ... common law right of informed consent encompasses the right of
an informed refusal of treatment."); Ann MacLean Massie, Withdrawal of Treatment for
Minors in a Persistent Vegetative State: Parents Should Decide, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 173, 189-
90 (1993) ("The necessity that informed consent be given prior to the administration of
medical care (absent emergency) is frequently characterized as the basis for the validity of
refusal-of-treatment decisions as well.").
386. SCHEUTZOW, supra note 383, at 6.
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the proximate cause of the injury." 38 7 Generally, if a healthcare pro-
vider fails to obtain a patient's informed consent to treatment, the
patient "is entitled to compensation for all losses sustained as a di-
rect and natural result of the treatment."38 8 While a minority of
states judge the duty to disclose based on a physician-oriented stand-
ard, asking what a reasonable physician would have disclosed under
the circumstances,389 a majority of states employ a reasonable patient
standard, asking what information a reasonable person would re-
quire in order to make an intelligent decision.390 Where the reasona-
ble patient standard is used, expert testimony by medical profession-
als is not necessary to demonstrate the information that a physician
was required to disclose, since the standard of disclosure is based on
what information a reasonable patient under the circumstances
would require in order to make an intelligent decision.3 91
The D.C. Circuit set out the patient-oriented standard in Canter-
bury v. Spence, stating that, "whether a particular peril must be di-
vulged [depends on] its materiality to the patient's decision: all risks
potentially affecting the [patient's] decision must be unmasked."392
Rejecting the professional-norm standard, the court asserted that,
"[r]espect for the patient's right of self-determination . . . demands a
standard set by law for physicians rather than one which physicians
may or may not impose upon themselves."393 In the words of the Mis-
souri Supreme Court, the requirements of informed consent include
that the patient has "a clear understanding of the risks and benefits
of the proposed treatment alternatives or nontreatment," and "a full
understanding of the nature of the disease and the prognosis."394 As
the California court of appeals has put it, "[a] physician violates his
duty to his patient and subjects himself to liability if he withholds
any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent con-
387. 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 151 (2017).
388. Rodriguez, supra note 383.
389. See, e.g., Retkwa v. Orentreich, 584 N.Y.S.2d 710 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
390. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Dessi v. United
States, 489 F. Supp. 722, 729 (E.D. Va. 1980); Boyd v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 593 So. 2d
427, 429 (La. Ct. App. 1991); McKinley v. Stripling, 763 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Tex. 1989). Some
courts have employed a subjective patient-oriented standard, asking if the patient in ques-
tion would have consented if adequately informed. See, e.g., Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d
554, 559 (Okla. 1979); see also Ashe v. Radiation Oncology Assocs., 9 S.W.3d 119, 121
(Tenn. 1999) ("The majority of jurisdictions having addressed this issue follow an objective
standard. A minority of jurisdictions having addressed the issue follow the subjective ap-
proach.").
391. See Korman v. Mallin, 858 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Alaska 1993); Barcai v. Betwee, 50
P.3d 946, 963 (Haw. 2002); Bernard v. Char, 903 P.2d 676, 688 (Haw. Ct. App. 1995), aff'd,
903 P.2d 667 (1995).
392. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786-87.
393. Id. at 784.
394. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 417 (Mo. 1988).
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sent by the patient to the proposed treatment."39 5 Moreover, in In re
Conroy, the New Jersey Supreme Court specified that, "the patient
must have a clear understanding of the risks and benefits of the pro-
posed treatment alternatives or nontreatment, along with a full un-
derstanding of the nature of the disease and the prognosis."396
Courts have maintained that a surrogate decisionmaker is enti-
tled to (at least) the same medical information that the patient would
have required in order to make an appropriate decision concerning
treatment. These might include such elements as:
[T]he degree of physical pain resulting from the medical condition,
treatment, and termination of treatment, respectively; the degree
of humiliation, dependence, and loss of dignity probably resulting
from the condition and treatment; the life expectancy and progno-
sis ... with and without treatment; the various treatment options;
and the risks, side effects, and benefits of each of those options.397
Additionally, the New Jersey Supreme Court specified that
"[p]articular care should be taken not to base a decision on a prema-
ture diagnosis or prognosis."398
At the least, medical professionals should be required to com-
municate the diagnostic uncertainty surrounding disorders of con-
sciousness to the surrogate decisionmakers who are tasked with
making decisions regarding patients' continuing care-decisions
which often include whether to continue or withdraw life support.
We believe that under the reasonable person standard, patients
with disorders of consciousness and their surrogates need more in-
formation from physicians than they are typically given in order to
make appropriate medical decisions. Surrogate decisionmakers might
reasonably decide differently if they are more fully informed both of
the diagnostic difficulties regarding disorders of consciousness and
the medical options that exist for people with severe disorders of con-
sciousness. We suggest that parties in this position will often be able
to demonstrate that they suffered a harm that would not have oc-
curred but for the failure to disclose, and accordingly should be enti-
tled to legal relief under the doctrine of informed consent.399
The prevalence of misdiagnosis and premature diagnosis of disor-
ders of consciousness is unacceptably high, from both a legal and an
ethical perspective. Clinicians and researchers have demonstrated
395. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. App.
1957).
396. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (N.J. 1985).
397. Id. at 1231.
398. Id.
399. See Corrigan v. Methodist Hosp., 869 F. Supp. 1202, 1206 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
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that this diagnostic error can be mitigated; to the extent that such
improvements are possible, standards of care must be adapted ac-
cordingly-a change which might require legal intervention. Moreo-
ver, while it is perhaps unreasonable to expect very high diagnostic
accuracy when it comes to disorders of consciousness, medical profes-
sionals have a duty to disclose diagnostic difficulties to the deci-
sionmakers who make treatment and life support decisions on behalf
of their loved ones. Ultimately, the optimal result of increased
awareness around these ethical and legal issues would not be more
lawsuits, but rather improved standards of care for people with se-
vere mental disabilities.
V. JUSTICE FOR PERSONS WITH SEVERE BRAIN INJURY
UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
To fully explore the rights and justice claims of persons with se-
vere brain injury, it is necessary to look beyond current domestic law
and consider international best practice and standards. These stand-
ards can serve as a guidepost and aspiration for efforts at reform.
Care and treatment of persons with severe brain injury raise ques-
tions of fundamental human rights recognized in international law.
This Part relies on the Convention of the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (CRPD), 400 which sets the global standard regarding
rights of persons with disabilities, as well as the international bill of
human rights,401 consisting of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR),4 02 the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR),40 3 and the International Covenant on Social, Eco-
nomic and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).40 4 The UDHR is not a treaty,
but as the foundational document of the human rights regime, it has
important "moral authority," as recognized by the U.S. Supreme
Court,4 05 and at least parts of it are considered customary interna-
400. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force May 3, 2008) [hereinafter CRPD].
401. See UNITED NATIONS, OHCHR, FACT SHEET NO. 2: THE INTERNATIONAL BILL
OF RIGHTS (1996), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.len.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H9GT-U3GD].
402. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter UDHR].
403. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
404. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
405. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004). The Supreme Court has also
referenced the UDHR in its analysis. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520
n.14 (1970) (citing UDHR, art. 25 "[o]n the issue of whether there is a 'right' to welfare
assistance"); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 n.13 (1965) (citing UDHR, art. 13 in discussing
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tional law.406 The CRPD and ICESCR were signed but have not been
ratified by the United States.40 7 The ICCPR was both signed and rati-
fied and is legally binding.408 As a member of this treaty, the United
States reports every few years on its compliance to the U.N. Human
Rights Committee, the expert body responsible for monitoring im-
plementation of the ICCPR.409 Additionally, the U.N. Human Rights
Council, a body of state representatives, regularly reviews each
state's human rights record, using peer pressure and shame to induce
compliance.4 10
In ratifying the ICCPR, however, the U.S. Senate included a dec-
laration that "the provisions of Article 1 through 27 of the Covenant
are not self-executing,"411 which aimed to "clarify that the Covenant
will not create a private cause of action in U.S. Courts."4 12 In report-
ing to the U.N. Human Rights Committee, the U.S. government ex-
plained that this declaration "did not limit the international obliga-
the requirements of due process); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 161 n.16
(1963) (noting "the right of every citizen to retain a nationality" in UDHR, art. 15).
406. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980) ("This prohibition has
become part of customary international law, as evidenced and defined by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights . . . ."); David A. Catania, The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and Sodomy Laws: A Federal Common Law Right to Privacy for Homo-
sexuals based on Customary International Law, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 289, 300-08 (1994);
Richard B. Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U.
CIN. L. REV. 367, 393 (1985) ("The starting point in ascertaining what international hu-
man rights norms have been received into customary international law-and therefore
are rules of decisions for domestic courts-commonly is thought to be the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights . . . ."); Eisuke Suzuki & Suresh Nanwani, Responsibility of
International Organizations: The Accountability Mechanisms of Multilateral Develop-
ment Banks, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 177, 195 (2005).
407. The CRPD was signed on July 30, 2009, and the ICESCR was signed on Octo-
ber 5, 1977. See Ratification Status for United States of America, OHCHR,
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_1ayouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountrylD=187
&Lang=EN [https://perma.cc/L26F-2QMM]. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, when a state has signed but not ratified a treaty, while it need not take
positive steps to comply with its provisions, it is obligated "to refrain from acts which
would defeat [its] object and purpose." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art.
18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter
Vienna Convention].
408. The ICCPR was signed by President Carter on October 5, 1977 and ratified by Con-
gress on June 8, 1992. See Ratification Status for United States of America, supra note 407.
409. See ICCPR, supra note 403, art. 40. For past U.S. reports to the Human
Rights Committee, see The United Nations Human Rights Treaties, BAYEFSKY.COM,
http://www.bayefsky.com/docs.php/area/reports/state/l84/node/3/treaty/ccpr/opt/0
[https://perma.cc/5PHQ-8CUX].
410. See Basic Facts About the UPR, OHCHR, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/
UPR/Pages/BasicFacts.aspx [https://perma.cc/S66L-V7UC]; see also What is the UPR?, UPR
INFO, https://www.upr-info.org/en/upr-process/what-is-it [https://perma.cc/8YTJ-GMNY].
411. U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
412. S. EXEC. REP. No. 102-23, at 19 (1992) (Conf. Rep.).
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tions of the United States under the Covenant. Rather, it means that,
as a matter of domestic law, the Covenant does not, by itself, create
private rights directly enforceable in U.S. courts."413 This leaves
open the intriguing possibility of using the ICCPR in conjunction
with domestic provisions in litigation. 414 In fact, U.S. courts have
referred to the ICCPR as an aid in interpretation.4 15 The ICCPR it-
self requires "an effective remedy" for violations,416 and the U.N.
Human Rights Committee clarified that this includes roles for the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government.417
While international human rights law does not serve as
a strong basis for litigation, it can be an important anchor for
advocacy. In particular, persons with severe brain injury may
anchor justice claims to international human rights such as the
rights to life, 418 health, 419 benefit from scientific progress, 420
413. Human Rights Comm., Rep. on the Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1993:
United States of America, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/Add.4 (1994).
414. Id. The U.S. government further explained that "the fundamental rights and free-
doms protected by the Covenant are already guaranteed as a matter of U.S. law, either by
virtue of constitutional protections or enacted statutes, and can be effectively asserted and
enforced by individuals in the judicial system on those bases," id., seeming to indicate that
constitutional protections and statutes should be interpreted as consistent with the ICCPR.
415. See, e.g., Roper v. Simms, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005); Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d
123, 131 n.21 (Or. 1981).
416. ICCPR, supra note 403, art. 2(3)(a).
417. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the General Le-
gal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶¶ 4, 7, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004). Additionally, under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, a reservation to a treaty is void if it is "incompatible with the object and purpose"
of that treaty. Vienna Convention, supra note 407, art. 19; see also John C. Yoo, Globalism
and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1959 (1999).
418. As both the ICCPR and CRPD recognize, "every human being has the inherent right
to life." ICCPR, supra note 403, art. 6(1); CRPD, supra note 400, art. 10; see also UDHR, su-
pra note 402, art. 3 ("Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.").
419. As set out in the ICESCR, human rights law recognizes "the right of everyone to
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health." ICESCR,
supra note 404, art. 12(1). The CRPD further clarifies that "persons with disabilities have
the right to the enjoyment of the highest . . . standard of health without discrimination on
the basis of disability." CRPD, supra note 400, art. 25. The CRPD also recognizes a right to
"comprehensive habilitation and rehabilitation services and programmes." CRPD, supra
note 400, art. 26. The CRPD specifically "[p]rohibit[s] discrimination against persons with
disabilities in the provision of health insurance" and the "discriminatory denial of health
care or health services." CRPD, supra note 400, art. 25(e), (f).
420. The ICESCR recognizes the right of everyone "[t]o enjoy the benefits of scientific
progress and its applications." ICESCR, supra note 404, art. 15(1)(b); see also UDHR, supra
note 402, art. 27(1). The CRPD elaborates on the state obligation "to undertake or promote
research and development of, and to promote the availability and use of new technologies,
including information and communications technologies, mobility aids, devices and assis-
tive technologies." CRPD, supra note 400, art. 4(g). Moreover, it requires states to "promote
the availability, knowledge and use of assistive devices and technologies, designed for per-
sons with disabilities, as they relate to habilitation and rehabilitation." CRPD, supra note
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education,4 21 freedom of expression,42 2 community,423 and equal
protection.424
Identifying a human rights issue provides not only the possibility
of a legal remedy, but also the mobilizing power of rights. Human
rights are much more than the legal framework to which they are
linked and also provide a language to articulate and mobilize around
justice concerns. Community mobilization complements litigation
and can play a critical role in advancing rights protections.42 5 The
Black Lives Matter movement426 and the campaign against solitary
400, art. 26(3). Under the CRPD, states must "undertake to collect appropriate infor-
mation, including statistical and research data, to enable them to formulate and imple-
ment policies" to protect basic rights. CRPD, supra note 400, art. 31.
421. The ICESCR encapsulates "the right of everyone to education" for the "full devel-
opment of the human personality and the sense of its dignity." ICESCR, supra note 404,
art. 13(1); see also UDHR, supra note 402, art. 26 ("Everyone has the right to education....
Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the
strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms."). The CRPD man-
dates "an inclusive education system at all levels and lifelong learning" to enable "develop-
ment by persons with disabilities of their personality, talents and creativity, as well as their
mental and physical abilities, to their fullest potential. . . ." CRPD, supra note 400, art. 24(1).
422. The ICCPR recognizes, "[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of expression,"
including "freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds . . . ."
ICCPR, supra note 403, art. 19(2); see also UDHR, supra note 402, art. 19 ("Everyone has
the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom . . . to seek, re-
ceive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.").
And, under the CRPD, states must "take all appropriate measures to ensure that persons
with disabilities can exercise the right to freedom of expression and opinion." CRPD, supra
note 400, art. 21. The first guiding principle set out by the CRPD is "[r]espect for inherent
dignity, individual autonomy including the freedom to make one's own choices, and inde-
pendence of persons." CRPD, supra note 400, art. 3(a).
423. The CRPD recognizes the "equal right of all persons with disabilities to live in the
community." States must take measures to ensure their "full inclusion and participation in
the community" and "to prevent isolation or segregation." CRPD, supra note 400, art. 19.
424. The ICCPR and UDHR proclaim, "Everyone shall have the right to recognition
everywhere as a person before the law." ICCPR, supra note 403, art. 16; UDHR, supra note
402, art. 6. People are also entitled to "equal protection of the law." ICCPR, supra note 403,
art. 26; UDHR, supra note 402, art. 7. The CRPD elaborates, "persons with disabilities
have the right to recognition everywhere as persons before the law." CRPD, supra note 400,
art. 12(1). Additionally, "all persons are equal before and under the law and are entitled
without any discrimination to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law." CRPD,
supra note 400, art. 5(1).
425. One example is the movement for marriage equality. See How It Happened, FREE-
DOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/how-it-happened (last visited Jan.
24, 2018). For a history of the movement and how campaigning complemented litigation,
see generally Winning the Freedom to Marry Nationwide, FREEDOM TO MARRY,
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2018).
426. In November 2014, Michael Brown's parents testified before the U.N. Committee
Against Torture regarding policy brutality and racial profiling in the United States. J.A.
Salaam, Parents of Mike Brown Take the Struggle to United Nations Forum, FINAL CALL,
http://www.finalcall.com/artman/publish/NationalNews2/article101922.shtml
[https://perma.cc/94UE-WLBM] (last updated Nov. 12, 2014); Deirdre Fulton, With Heavy
Hearts, Activists Carry Human Rights Messages from #FergusonToGeneva, COM-
2018] 379
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
confinement427 have used international human rights norms to legit-
imize and affirm local advocacy and bring global attention to an is-
sue. There is now a vibrant movement working towards the imple-
mentation of human rights law, which pairs domestic legal argu-
ments with human rights standards.42 8 There is also a growing hu-
man rights city movement, which endorses international human
rights standards and includes cities like Boston, Massachusetts;
Washington, D.C.; and, most recently, Mountain View, California.429
These developments may open additional avenues for advocacy for
the rights of persons with severe brain injury.
When entered into force in May 2008, the CRPD took a significant
step in affirming the dignity of people with disabilities and their
standing within the human community. The CRPD asserts that "dis-
crimination against any person on the basis of disability is a violation
of the inherent dignity and worth of the human person."43 0 However,
even within the disability movement, persons with severe brain inju-
ries are largely invisible and marginalized.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has described the clinical needs and legal vulnerabili-
ties of persons with severe brain injury. We also identified sources of
law that can be used to protect the rights and improve the lives of
persons with severe brain injury, assessing which legal strategies are
the most promising paths to medical recovery and subsequent com-
munity integration. We began by analyzing sources of federal law; we
suggested that when it comes to asserting rights-based claims on be-
MONDREAMS (Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.commondreams.org/news/2014/11/11/heavy-hearts-
activists-carry-human-rights-message-fergusontogeneva [https://perma.cc/PH5W-T6HX].
427. We Can Stop Solitary, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/feature/we-can-stop-solitary
[https://perma.cc/XDE7-SDYJ]; Stop Solitary: Advocacy Campaign Tools, ACLU, https://
www. aclu.org/other/stop-solitary-advocacy-campaign-tools [https://perma.cc/U5RC-JXYV].
428. See U.S. HUM. RTS. NETWORK, http://www.ushrnetwork.org/ (last visited Jan. 24,
2018); The Bringing Human Rights Home Lawyers' Network, COLUM. L. SC.,
http://www.law.columbia.edu/human-rights-institutelbhrh-lawyers-network [https://perma.
cc/K8FB-9TSU].
429. See National Human Rights Cities Alliance, U.S. HUM. RTS. NETWORK,
http://www.ushrnetwork.org/our-work/project/national-human-rights-city-network
[https://perma.cc/38RC-Q5GA]. There is additionally a U.S. city movement specifically
focused on implementing the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation against Women through city ordinances and resolutions. For a list of involved cities,
see THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE EDUC. FUND & WOMEN'S INTERCULTURAL NETWORK,
CITIES FOR CEDAW: STATUS OF LOCAL ACTIVITIES (2017), http://citiesforcedaw.org/
wp-content/uploads/2017/0 1/Landscape-Cities-for-CEDAW-Branded-for-Website-January-
2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5WQ-QE3T].
430. CRPD, supra note 400, pmbl. (h). Moreover, the first guiding principle of the CRPD
refers to "[r]espect for inherent dignity ... of persons." CRPD, supra note 400, art. 3(a).
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half of persons with severe brain injury at the federal level, the ADA
and its amendments are the most promising piece of legislation. It is
unclear, however, what the fate of persons with disabilities will be
under a Trump Administration. The ADA had bipartisan support and
was passed during a Republican administration that had vetoed oth-
er civil rights legislation.4 3' Nevertheless, the current federal admin-
istration may not prioritize the civil rights of persons with disabili-
ties or Olmstead enforcement responsibilities to the same extent as
the Obama Administration.4 32
With respect to capabilities-based legal strategies at the federal
level, we reviewed the role select administrative agencies can play
with respect to facilitating access to rehabilitation and medical devic-
es that can aid in fostering recovery from severe brain injury. Many
of these strategies would require significant resources, such as orga-
nized lobbying. Additionally, given the Trump Administration's at-
tack on the administrative state,4 33 the extent to which a focus on
regulation will benefit persons with severe brain injury is unclear.
We next analyzed sources of state law that may be used as tools to
promote the societal integration of persons with severe brain injury.
In a time when the federal government increasingly has been defer-
ring to the states on matters such as healthcare and civil rights,434
advocates may have more success focusing on state and local laws.
State statutes that address disability discrimination and provide
more protections than the ADA may be particularly promising means
to assert rights-based claims. There may also be an opportunity to
spread progressive state laws such as California's through coopera-
tive groups like the National Conference of State Legislatures. Fur-
thermore, bringing lawsuits grounded in various tort claims, if suc-
cessful, may lead to greater awareness of the marginalization of indi-
viduals with severe brain injury and favorable legislative change.
This latter strategy would likely require significant media exposure
to put pressure on the legislature.
We concluded this Article by examining sources of international
law. Although the Trump Administration has emphasized isolation-
431. Krieger, supra note 114, at 1-2.
432. Indeed, the current administration is retreating from supporting rights-based
claims of other marginalized groups. See, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, Jo Becker & Julie
Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Rescinds Rules on Bathrooms for Transgender Students, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/us/politics/devos -sessions-
transgender-students-rights.html?_r=O.
433. See Scott Horsley, Trump Orders Agencies to Reduce Regulations, NPR (Feb. 24, 2017,
2:11 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/02/24/517059327/trump-orders-agencies-to-reduce-regulations.
434. Even the ACA delegates responsibility to the states through creation of exchanges,
selection of a benchmark insurance plan, and Medicaid changes.
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ism and international human rights law is not directly applicable in
domestic litigation, the language of rights, equality, and dignity for
persons with disabilities articulated in international treaties and dec-
larations is both aspirational and inspirational. It provides a goal for
full inclusion of persons with disabilities and can be used as an an-
chor in building a social movement that can sustain law and policy
change, or as an interpretive aid in disability discrimination cases.
Furthermore, and consistent with our argument that state law may
be a more promising avenue for reform than federal law, there is a
recent trend of municipalities endorsing human rights standards.
Advocates for persons with severe brain injury can draw on these
standards in urging their local governments to make changes to pro-
mote the full inclusion of persons with severe brain injury in their
communities. For example, changes to zoning ordinances would make
it easier to create more community-based treatment facilities. Simi-
larly, municipalities could provide financial incentives to organiza-
tions to provide such care.
To conclude, there are many sources of law that can be lever-
aged-both in traditional and novel ways-to ameliorate the clinical
and social problems faced by persons with severe brain injury, and to
promote their recovery and reintegration into their communities.
Here, we have analyzed many of these possibilities, and have at-
tempted to illustrate their relative merits as well as limitations. Giv-
en the uncertainty about current federal laws and administrative en-
vironment, we recommend increased attention to state law as a basis
for legal action that can help create a more just society for persons
with severe brain injuries.
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